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TURNING GIRLS INTO WOMEN:
RE-EVALUATING MODERN STATUTORY RAPE LAW*
Micbelle Oberman**

INTRODUCTION
During the spring of 1993, a group of teenage boys who called
themselves the Spur Posse' combined adolescent competitiveness and
sexual bravado to develop a "game" in which members of the group
sought to have sexual relations with as many females as possible.
Members scored one point for each sexual conquest--i.e., each time
they achieved orgasm with a girl.2
The gang first made headlines when eight of its members were
arrested on charges ranging from lewd conduct with a minor under the
age of fourteen to rape by intimidation.3 From a legal perspective, the
astonishing thing about the Spur Posse case was not the fact that the

* Reprinted by special permission of Northwestern University School of Law, Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology. ©1994.
*" Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1983, Cornell
University; M.P.H. 1988, J.D. 1988, University of Michigan. This Article could not
have been completed without the tireless assistance of Marion Buckley, J.D., DePaul
University College of Law Class of 1994, and Jessica Penkower, DePaul University
College of Law Class of 1996; the enormous inspiration and critical feedback
provided by Jane Larson, Marylen Oberman, and Carol Sanger; and the valuable
insights of many readers, including Susan Bandes, Lisa Brush, John Decker, Patty
Gerstenblith, Hal Krent, Roberta Kwall, Larry Marshall, Jane Rutherford, and
Stephen Schulhofer. My thanks also go out to participants at the DePaul University
College of Law Faculty Workshop and at the Northwestern University Annual
Feminist Legal Theory Symposium and to Dean John Roberts and the DePaul
University Faculty Research Support Program.
'The group comprised 20 to 30 youths, mostly white, all residents of Lakewood,
California. Seth Mydans, High School Gang Accused of Raping for 'Points', N.Y.
TIMES, March 20, 1993, at A6. Although some had been arrested in the past for
burglary, theft, and assault, id., the boys were widely reported as being "the popular
guys." Jill Smolowe, Sex with a Scorecard, TIME, April 5, 1993, at 41.
2 The goal was to score as many "points" as possible. Smolowe, supra note 1;
Mydans, supra note 1 (quoting L.A. Sheriffs Dept. Lt. Joseph Surgent: "It didn't
matter whether the girls consented oi not. If they consented it was a point. If they
didn't consent, it was a point.").
' Initially, the charges totalled 17 felony counts of lewd conduct, unlawful
intercourse and rape of seven girls aged 10 to 16. Jean Seligmann, A Town's Divided
Loyalties, NEWSWEEK, April 12, 1993, at 29. The ages of the arrestees ranged from 15
to 18. Mydans, supra note 1.
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gang members wanted to have sex with more than one partner,4 nor
even that they actually had so many partners Rather, it was that after
weeks of investigation, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's
Office dropped all of the charges except one on the grounds that its
"policy is not to file criminal charges where there is consensual sex
between teenagers."6
While the District Attorney's office classified the sex these boys
had as consensual, others went even further, endorsing it as healthy.
Some parents of Spur Posse members bragged about their sons'
escapades. One mother said, "What can you do? It's a testosterone
thing. ' One father referred to his son as a "virile specimen."8 Another
father was quoted as saying, "Nothing my boy did was anything that
any red-blooded American boy wouldn't do. He has to defend himself
from these girls. They are promiscuous. " 9
Although the criminal justice system labeled the sex
"consensual," there was no evidence that the girls considered their
experiences pleasant or recreational. Quite the contrary image seems to
emerge from the media accounts, which describe rather violent
encounters, rife with ambivalence and coercion, and seemingly void of
mutual affection.' ° Yet, neither the District Attorney's statements nor
One young woman who attends Lakewood High School stated: "More than
three-quarters of the guys in school will have sex with anything they can." David
Ferrell, Eight High School Students Held in Rape, Assault Case, L.A. TIMES, March
19, 1993, at Al.
' These teenage boys had each engaged in sexual relations with anywhere from
20 to 73 different girls. Amy Cunningham, Sex in High School, GLAMOUR, Sept.
1993, at 253; Joan Didion, Trouble in Lakewood, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 1993,
at 46; Ferrell, supra note 4.
6 Didion, supra note 5, at 54. Another writer stated that the
D.A.'s policy was not
to file charges in unlawful intercourse cases "if the minors involved are of roughly the
same age and social experience." Jennifer Allen, Boys; Hanging With the Spur Posse,
4

ROLLING STONE, July 8-22, 1993, at 55. At least one writer reported that the charges

were dropped because the girls had consented in some of the sexual encounters, "and
in the other cases, the D.A. felt he couldn't prove that the sex was not consensual."
Cunningham, supra note 5.
Smolowe, supra note 1.
8 Allen, supra note 6, at 63.
9Michelle Stacey, Bad Boys: Why Groups of Boys Take Part in Sexual Assault,
SEVENTEEN,Nov. 1993, at 124.
'o
The boys involved reportedly had a reputation for being "into violence," and, in
fact, "represented themselves as a violent group." Id. (quoting Detective Doug Blades,
of the L.A. County Sheriffs Department); Mydans, supra note 1 (quoting L.A.
Sheriffs Dept. Lt. Joseph Surgent: "This group of boys had a reputation. The
reputation was that it was a group to be reckoned with. Several of our victims have
come forward and basically stated that they submitted to a sex act because they were
afraid.").
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the media provide any real insight into the girls' views of their

experiences."

Rather than yielding a sense of what "consensual" sex

meant to the girls involved, the Spur Posse stories contain only
defensive justifications for the sexual episodes, such as the girls had
consented,12 or the girls were sluts and the boys could not be blamed,
since "boys will be boys. '" 3
The sexual activities described in the media accounts were not
glorified games of "spin the bottle," nor even scenes of furtive
intercourse with a boyfriend in the back seat of a car. Rather, they
were stories of a fifteen-year-old boy who climbed through a bedroom
window and demanded sex from an eleven-year-old girl;'" of a group of
boys lining up to have sex with one girl, whose clothes had been taken
away from her by gang members demanding that she have sex with
them, since she had had sex with another member;' 5 and of boys who
described their typical sexual encounter as "just throw a couple of
pumps, and you're done,"' 6 and who distinguished it from the kind of
One female student said, "I have friends who were beaten up and raped by them.
If a girl would not sleep with them, they would beat her up." Ferrell, supra note 4.
" While the Spur Posse members--including one of the boys who had been
arrested--appeared on numerous television programs, initially only one of the victims-an 11 -year-old--spoke out publicly. In a poignant expression of the double standard
imposed on her as a victim, she noted that the public had blamed the victims of the
Posse, calling the victims sluts; then she added, "It makes me kind of upset. I think
there should be names for the boys." Somini Sengupta, Spur Posse Victim Speaks Out
to Encourage Others, L.A. TIMES, April 28, 1993, at B3.
Later, other victims also appeared on television talk shows--in one case, in
disguise--and some girls agreed to be quoted in press accounts of the incidents.
Cunningham, supra note 5, at 255, 322.
2 "When they're having sex, it's sex. It's rape afterward when they're embarrassed
and they change their minds," said one of the Posse members. Ferrell, supra note 4.
13 Mydans, supra note 1; see also Nancy Gibbs, How Should We Teach
Our Kids
About Sex?, TIME, May 24, 1993, at 60 (reporting that among 500 teenagers
surveyed, two-thirds said that a boy who has sex increases his reputation, while a girl
who has sex suffers a decline in her reputation). The boys became overnight media
stars, and news stories about the incidents abounded. The Spur Posse made headlines
in daily newspapers ranging from the Sacramento Bee to The New York Times; in
national news magazines such as Time and Newsweek; in literary magazines such as
The New Yorker, in women's magazines such as Glamour and Seventeen; and in
popular publications such as Rolling Stone. In addition, the story was discussed on
Cable News Network, National Public Radio, and Nightline, and the Spurs
themselves appeared on television programs such as Dateline NBC and The Home
Show, as well as talk shows hosted by Phil Donahue, Montel Williams, Maury
Povich, Jenny Jones, and Jane Whitney. Cunningham, supra note 5, at 253.
1 Seligmann, supra note
3.
" The girl's clothes were returned to her only after she began screaming for help.
Cunningham, supra note 5, at 255.
,6Allen, supra note 6, at 62.
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sex one had with a girl one really liked: "Whores you just nut and you

leave. Good girls that are fine and respectable, you give them the allnight thing, you please them and romance them... and eat them out
and shit."' 7
Although it is conceivable that a teenage girl might "consent" to
sexual intercourse in some circumstances, the seemingly facile
conclusion that so long as she consents, any act of intercourse with her
is freely chosen and, therefore, legally permissible is troubling. While
girls may dress and act like sexy women, they are still girls. 8 And the
7

Allen, supra note 6, at 128. The Spur Posse incident took place in a Los

Angeles suburb; incidents of gang-related sexual activity have been reported
elsewhere. For example, in Montclair, N.J., six boys, ages 13 to 16, were arrested for
allegedly sexually assaulting a seventh-grade girl; in Houston, two teenage girls were
brutally raped and murdered by six members of a local gang (aged 14 to 18); in New
York City, gangs of adolescent boys terrorized young girls at public swimming pools
through an activity called "whirlpooling"--the boys lock arms, surround girls, and,
under cover of churning water, grope the girls. In at least one instance, a girl's suit
was ripped off and a boy inserted a finger into her vagina. Michele Ingrassia, Life
Means Nothing, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 1993, at 14. In Glen Ridge, N.J., a group of
boys sexually assaulted a mentally retarded girl--a crime that reportedly was
"copycatted" in North Carolina. Stacey, supra note 9, at 124.
For more discussion regarding how sexual encounters among teens has changed
over the past decades, see BETH L. BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH To BACK SEAT
(1988). See also Rena Pederson, Young Girls Targeted as Sex Objects, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, March 31, 1993, at B-7 (reporting the sexual assault of a 13- yearold girl on a crowded school bus in Texas, which was accomplished by one boy as six
boys aged 12 to 14 held her down and other students on the bus laughed as she
struggled); Judy Chicurel, He Loves Me Not; A Rise in High School Dating Violence
Has Some Teenagers Asking: What is Love, NEWSDAY, March 12, 1992, at 11-64
(reporting that national and regional studies indicate that violence by teenage boys has
increased dramatically in the past decade, and attributing some girls' endurance of
such abuse to a feeling of "neediness," which in turn may be due to many young
people today growing up as "latchkey" children, lacking security and fulfilling family
relationships).
"SOften, people struggle over whether to call a 13-year-old female a girl or a
woman. This struggle reflects the blurred line between girls and women. In part, this
blurring is semantic. Those who recognize the harm that is done by labeling women
as "girls" find that calling females "women" connotes a higher level of respect. Thus,
they might call teenage girls "women" because they recognize that a "girl" might not
be entitled to respect, and that teenage girls need both respect and dignity. Yet, "girl"
is not simply a pejorative label; it also describes a young female. Thus, far from being
merely a semantic issue, the struggle over how to label teenage girls reflects an
understanding that they are vulnerable, in precisely the way adult women are
vulnerable, to having their worth diminished.
This vulnerability relates directly to the issue of sexuality in a society which
eroticizes girls and portrays them as legitimate targets of male sexual desire. See
Nancy J. Perry, Why It's So Tough to be a Girl, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 82. The
most common media messages regarding girls' sexuality are neither warnings about
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fact that some girls might consent to sex which is inherently exploitive,
such as that documented in the Spur Posse accounts, is not evidence of
their competence to consent, nor of their "womanliness," but rather, of
their immaturity and vulnerability to exploitation.' 9
A multiplicity of factors induce girls to consent to sex:2 ° to feel
liked or loved,2 1 to feel closer to someone,2 2 to become popular.24
Desire often is not the motivating force in girls' sexual exploration.
the harms and risks inherent in teen sex (acquaintance rape, teenage pregnancy, and
even HIV), nor praises about the virtues of virginity. Instead, as is revealed by even a
perfunctory survey of teen magazines, let alone television programs, the dominant
message urges girls to embrace and perfect the coy, passive-aggressive sex role which
society has allocated to them. Id. More evidence of the sexualization of girls is seen in
a recent study which correlates statistics from public records relating to births,
pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases among teenage girls with age of male
partners. The study demonstrates that 70% of the male partners are over age 20, and
15% are over age 25. See Mike Males, Adult Liaison in the "Epidemic" of "Teenage"
Birth, Pregnancy, and Venereal Disease, 29 J. SEX RES. 525 (1992).
'9 Women generally do not consent to have sex with a group of men for
recreation. When there is evidence of "consensual" assembly-line sexual activity,
most often the women are receiving drugs or money in exchange for sex. The law
does not privilege this conduct--generally speaking, the law criminalizes it as
prostitution or rape. Compare Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for
Feminists in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, 298, 299 (Mary

Becker et al. eds., 1994) (discussing money as the paramount reason women become
prostitutes, and discussing the distinctions between "forced" and "voluntary"
prostitution) with Evelina Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 303-04 (arguing that prostitution is not
voluntary).
One recent ethnographic account of women "consenting" to sex with multiple
partners is found in CARL S. TAYLOR, GIRLS, GANGS, WOMEN AND DRUGS (1993).

This book presents a compilation of numerous interviews with girls and women in
Detroit gangs; the stories they tell are rife with images of "crack whores"-- those who
trade sex for drugs or money. Id. at 84-85.
20 This article addresses adolescent sexuality in the context of the crime of
statutory rape. Because statutory rape laws generally regulate conduct between males
and underage females, references in this article to sexuality are to heterosexual
activity, unless otherwise indicated.
", See infra text accompanying note 298 ("girls express longing for emotional
attachment, romance, and respect"); Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and
Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29
(Feb. 1988); Deborah Tolman, Doing Desire: Adolescent Girls' Struggles For/With
Sexuality (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
22Cunningham, supra note 5, at 321 (quoting Pat Socia, a "sex educator").
23 Karen J. Cohen, Young Girls With Nowhere to Go, STATE NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 29, 1993 (thinking back to her high school days and recalling the paths to high
status: being "very, very popular," having a boyfriend, or "the dismal popularity
shortcut of having a lot of sex with a lot of boys. A choice that I can't imagine
enhances a young girl's self-esteem.").
24 Fine,

supra note 21.
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Moreover, girls sexual partners are not necessarily restricted to teenage
boys. Indeed, one recent study demonstrates that a considerable
percentage of teenage girls' male partners may in fact be over the age of
twenty." In the not too distant past, these factors contributed to a
general assumption that, in sexual matters, just as in other adult
matters, girls could not take care of themselves--that because of their
immaturity and some adults' skills in playing to girls' insecurities,
adolescent girls needed society to help take care of them.
Nonetheless, over the past two decades, society has revised its
thinking about girls' sexuality. The law reflects this revision through
the current formulation and application of statutory rape laws. Since
the early 1970s, through a variety of de jure and de facto reforms,
society has displaced 700 years of law premised upon girls' inability to
26
give legally valid consent to sex. This change has been supported by
a broad coalition of liberals, public health advocates, medical experts,
feminists, .judges, and legislators. For the most part, the law now gives
its tacit blessing to "consensual" acts of sexual intercourse with minors.
"Consensual sex" is a legal term of art. When asked to define
and identify consensual heterosexual sex, differentiating it from
coerced sex, modem scholars divide themselves into various camps.
Some believe that there can be no truly consensual sex in a society
premised upon the sexual, social, and economic subordination of
women.17 Others acknowledge that a woman's sexuality is constructed,
25
Males, supra note 18.
26 Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 757, 762 n.35 (1980) (citing the Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3

Edw. 1, c.13: "[Tihe King prohibiteth that none do ravish, nor take away by force,
any Maiden within Age.").
27 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of
Sexual Conduct, 61 S.CAL.L.REV. 777, 814-15 (1988). The radical critique of
consent posits that "the social meaning of 'consent' is inherently tied to a system of
unequal sexual relationships in which the man actively initiates the sexual encounter
and the woman is relegated to the more passive role of responding to initiatives. In the
abstract, consent may be gender neutral. But as long as women do not in fact have the
opportunity to initiate sexual relationships on equal terms with men, the concept of
consent continues to suggest that women are appropriately the passive parties in
sexual relationships."
Chamallas explains this view through the arguments posited by philosopher

Carole Patemen and feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon. Id. at 815 n.165
("The conventional use of 'consent' helps reinforce the beliefs about the 'natural'
characters of the sexes and the sexual double standard discussed in this article.
Consent must always be given to something; in the relationship between the sexes, it
is always women who are held to consent to men. The 'naturally' superior, active, and

sexually aggressive male makes an initiative, or offers a contract, to which a
'naturally' subordinate, passive woman 'consents.' An egalitarian sexual relationship
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but argue that even within the oppressive construct, women experience
sexual desire and pleasure, which the law must work to identify. 28 Still
others advocate adoption of a "rational criminal law of sex," which
would abandon the conjunction of force and nonconsent in the law.29
At its core, this debate is about the validity of an individual's
consent to sex, and the conditions under which that consent will
insulate someone who engages in sex with that individual from later
cannot rest on this basis; it cannot be grounded in 'consent.' Perhaps the most telling
aspect of the problem of women and consent is that we lack a language through which
to help constitute a form of personal life in which two equals freely agree to create a
lasting association together. Expanding on the Patemen position, Catharine
MacKinnon has argued that the failure to expose the 'presupposition' behind the
conventional use of the term 'consent' is 'integral to gender inequality.' [citations
omitted]. She sees consent as operating as 'women's form of control' in sexual
encounters with men. The fundamental inadequacy of this form of control or power is
that the 'model does not envision a situation the woman controls being placed in, or
choices she frames, yet the consequences are attributable to her as if the sexes began
at arm's length, on equal terrain, as in the contract fiction."').
See also Tolman, supra note 21, at 3 ("[G]irls are taught to recognize and keep a
lid on the sexual desire of boys but not taught to acknowledge or even to recognize
their own sexual feelings.").
28 Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 56 (1993)
[hereinafter Henderson] ("MacKinnon's denigration of women's ability to tell the
difference between sex and rape leaves the current structures of heterosexuality
unchallenged, unmodified, untouched. . . . The Dworkin and MacKinnon stories
negate women's expressed wishes and experiences and ironically reinforce women's
lack of control in heterosexual relations.").
See also Fine, supra note 21 (writing that the discourse surrounding sexuality in
sex ed classes focus primarily on sexuality as violence, as victimization, and as
individual morality, with desire vis a vis females hardly addressed); Lynne
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. AND PHIL. 127 (1992) [hereinafter
Henderson, Rape] (part of the goal of empowering women requires recognizing and
articulating the "discourse of [sexual] desire" as experienced by heterosexual
women); Tolman, supra note 21.
29 Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference
Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM.L.REv. 1780, 1799, 1806
(1992). Dripps posits that pressures to have sex have varying grades of legitimacy-some pressures are perfectly moral, while others constitute serious crimes. Id. at 1788.
Thus, he advocates extracting consent from rape law and replacing it with a variety of
new statutory offenses that would focus on culpable conduct aimed at causing other
individuals to engage in sexual acts. Id. at 1798.
For other proposed changes in the law of rape, see SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE
(1987); Susan Estrich, 'Rape', 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (arguing that the proper
focus of rape law should be on the man's mens rea as to consent in sexual interactions,
and thus, negligence as to consent would be sufficient to establish culpability for
rape); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. AND PHIL. 217, 221 (1989)
(suggesting the adoption of a "reasonable woman" standard for determining consent
to sexual interactions, based on whether a reasonable woman under the same
circumstances would consent to sexual intercourse).
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criminal liability for that act. Considerable legal scholarship discusses
the criminal justice system's struggle to differentiate consensual sex
from nonconsensual sex (i.e. rape). Primarily, this work addresses the
system's inability to identify nonconsensual sex in the absence of
evidence of force.3 °

Far less scholarly attention has focused on the nature of a valid
consent to sex. As an academic matter, this might seem a rather easy
question. Those who are not legally competent cannot consent to sex,
and thus, evidence that they consented will not provide a defense
against a rape charge. However, as a practical matter, those who are
not legally competent often are sexually active. The most challenging
members of this category are teenage girls, over half of whom are
sexually active. 3' Almost everyone would agree that age is relevant to
an assessment of an individual's ability to consent to sex. A five-yearold's consent should not constitute a defense to a charge of rape against
her.32 However, when the alleged victim of a sexual assault is a
consenting adolescent, the consensus falters, and society is forced to
determine when a girl is old enough to say "yes" to sex.
As a result of moving to a consent-based standard in the
enforcement of statutory rape laws, modem criminal law has turned
girls from "jail bait" into "fair game" without considering the nature
and meaning of consensual sexual activity for girls, or whether any of
the factors that might induce consent should be legally impermissible.
The presumption underlying modem law governing adolescent girls'
sexuality is that girls are mature enough to make autonomous decisions
regarding sexuality. However, the growing body of research on female
adolescence calls into question the presumption that girls are fully
capable of protecting themselves. That is, researchers consistently have
found that for girls, adolescence is a time of acute crisis, in which selfesteem, body image, academic confidence, and the willingness to speak
out decline precipitously.
Such evidence reveals a significant
likelihood that girls are vulnerable in sexual encounters--vulnerable in
precisely the manner which the common law of statutory rape
anticipated and sought to remedy.
30

See, e.g., Steven Schulhofer, Taking Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and

Beyond, 11 L. AND PHIL. 35 (1992); Dripps, supra note 29; Henderson, supra note 28.
" Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Trends in 1987 and 1988: Age and Race, 24
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 85, 86 (March/April 1992) (reporting that among

women aged 15-19, 53% have had sexual intercourse).
32

But see RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW (1992) (arguing sex

among children and with children should be legalized).
31 See infra notes 224 to 252 and accompanying text (discussing research
into
girls' psycho-social development).
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This Article challenges the assumptions underlying modem
statutory rape law by contrasting them both with other legal paradigms
governing adolescents, and also with the current psycho-social
literature regarding adolescence. Section I analyzes modem statutory
rape law, and documents and evaluates the decriminalization of sexual
activity involving minor girls. Section II explores the treatment of
minors in other areas of the law, evaluating the extent to which the law
has increased minors' rights and obligations in other civil law contexts.
This analysis reveals surprising inconsistencies in the law's treatment of
minors. While the law continues to intervene to protect minors in
decision-making involving contracts and medical treatment, in most
cases the law holds minor girls to an adult standard when evaluating
their decisions regarding sexual activity. Section III describes current
research in adolescent development, and specifically addresses
limitations on girls' capacity for autonomy and consent in sexual
interactions. The final section builds on this evidentiary basis, arguing
that in light of girls' vulnerability to coercion, law makers must revive
and reconfigure the crime of statutory rape.
I. LEGAL REGULATION OF TEEN SEXUALITY
The Los Angeles District Attorney's office issued the following
statement in an attempt to justify its decision not to file charges in the
Spur Posse Case: "After completing an extensive investigation and
analysis of the evidence, our conclusion is that there is no credible
evidence of forcible rape involving any of these boys. . . . The
arrogance and contempt for young women which have been displayed,
while appalling, cannot form the basis for criminal charges." 4 This
explanation is puzzling, because the boys' behavior was not only
arrogant and contemptful, but it also violated California's law against
sexual intercourse with a minor.3" Under that law, those boys who were
' Didion, supra note 5, at 54 (emphasis added).
" CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1994). This statute defines "unlawful sexual

intercourse with a minor" as follows:
(a) Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with

a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor. For the
purposes of this section, a 'minor' is a person under the age of 18 years.
(b) Any person who engages in an act of unlawful intercourse with a minor who
is not more than three years older or three years younger than the perpetrator, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
(c) Any person who engages in an act of unlawful intercourse with a minor who
is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a
misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not

exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
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not more than three years older than their victims were guilty of
misdemeanors, and those who were more than three years older were
guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony. The District Attorney's
office dismissed these violations, stating that, " a lthough there is
evidence of unlawful sexual intercourse, it is the policy of this office
not to file criminal charges where there is consensual sex between
,,36

teenagers ....

The notion (implicit in the District Attorney's statement) that
girls legally consent to sexual activity marks a dramatic shift in the
legal regulation of teenage girls' sexuality. Consensual sex with an
underage female was unheard of at common law.37 Anyone who had

sexual contact with an underage female committed a criminal offense,
regardless of whether she consented to the contact. 38 The current
departure from the common law not only decriminalizes that behavior,
but also confronts girls with the same limitation that women who
attempt to prosecute rape already face--the victim must show evidence
of force.3 9

Various scholars have demonstrated that, because of the
evidentiary ambiguities inherent in a search for nonconsent, the search
for nonconsent is essentially indistinguishable from a search for
evidence of force. 4° As a result, consent does not reflect the descriptive
(d) Any person over the age of 21 years who engages in an act of unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor who is under 16 years of age is guilty of either a
misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years.
In 1993, the statute defined unlawful sexual intercourse as that taking place with
a female less than 18 years of age.
36Didion, supra note 5, at 54 (quoting statement released by Los Angeles
District
Attorney's office).
17 Eidson, supra note 26; see also infra notes 58 to 83 and accompanying
text
(discussing the history of statutory rape laws).
3

Eidson, supra note 26, at 757.

'9Schuthofer,

supra note 30. See also Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, No. 89 M.D.
1992, 1994 WL 224779, at *2 (Pa. Oct. 27, 1994) ("As to complainant's testimony
that she stated 'no' throughout the encounter with the Appellee, we point out that,
while such an allegation of fact would be relevant to the issue of consent, it is not
relevant to the issue of force."). See also GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 217 (1989) (discussing
themes of male innocence and female guilt as it affects juries' and legal actors'
interpretations of rape, vis a vis victims' use of drugs, birth control pills, and explicit
language, and noting that all these factors influence jurors' verdicts).
40 See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 29, at 1788 ("Contemporary
rape statutes ... favor
a binary classification of sex into consensual and nonconsensual cases. The law
then superimposes the requirement of force on the nonconsensual cases to identify
cases of rape.").

20041

STA TUTOR Y RAPE LA W

factual inquiry by which the system differentiates sex from rape, but,
more precisely, represents a normative categorization. Essentially, " c
onsent is only the label we attach to cases of conduct deemed
legitimate."4 ' Because, until quite recently, all sexual conduct with
unmarried teenage girls was criminal, the very notion that sexual
contact with them might be deemed consensual and thus legitimate,
raises two relevant legal questions: First, how did society come to
believe that there are conditions under which it is permissible for
anyone to have sexual intercourse with a teenage girl? And second,
how should the legal system define and identify those conditions?
A. A Brief History of Statutory Rape
Statutory rape, which is "at least as ancient as the 4000-year-old Code
of Hammurabi" was codified in English law in 1275.2 Essentially,
statutory rape criminalizes acts which would not otherwise be classified
43
as rape. Initially, the age of consent was twelve; in 1576, the age was
lowered to ten."
Statutory rape laws were absorbed into the American legal
system via the English common law.4'5 Early American lawmakers set
the age of consent at ten,46 but over the course of the nineteenth century,
the states gradually raised the age, some to as high as eighteen or
twenty-one. 7 Some states provided increased penalties for adult men
who had sex with pre-pubescent girls, and lesser penalties when the
male was younger than the female.48

Dripps, supra note 29, at 1787; Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 94
("Nlonconsensual intercourse is not now considered criminal; the existing
framework requires proof of force.").
42 Eidson, supra note 26, at 762.
4'

43

Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 94.

" Id.; see also James McCollum, Case Development, 25 HOWARD L.J. 341, 342
(1982).

45 Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63
TEx.L.REv. 387, 403 (1984); Eidson, supra note 26, at 762; McCollum, supra note
44, at 359 n.170 (noting that statutory rape laws were developed because "it was
believed that certain men would sexually misuse immature girls if laws were not
enacted to protect young females.").
6Olsen, supra note 45, at 403.

Id.; McCollum, supra note 44, at 356 n.148 (noting that Tennessee set the age
of consent at 21, and adding that currently the age ranges from 11 in Arkansas, South
41

Carolina, Washington, and New York, to 18 in Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida,

Idaho, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin).
For a review of statutory rape cases, particularly in California, see McCollum,
supra note 44.
8 Olsen, supra note 45, at 404; Eidson, supra note 26, at 764-66.
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Statutory rape laws were gender-specific, criminalizing sexual
relations with young females, but not with young males.
Commentators note that the laws reflected the historical legal
perception of women and girls as "special property in need of special
protection. 4 9 American courts in the 19th century originally adopted
statutory rape as a strict liability offense, in accordance with English
law.50 It did not matter whether the victim looked older than the age of
consent, that she consented, or even that she initiated sexual contact. If
she was underage, the law was violated. However, since a statutory
rape offense could as easily have been charged as a fornication
offense, 5' the age limits in statutory rape laws were viewed as
determinative of the level of punishment rather than of liability for the
sexual encounter."
Therefore, the notion of age as a "sentence
enhancer" is integral to the common law construction of statutory rape.
At common law, men accused of statutory rape often asserted
two claims in an effort to exculpate themselves: that the accused was
reasonably mistaken as to the victim's age,53 that the victim was
" McCollum, supra note 44, at 355-56 (stating, "This concept of a woman as
property was further clarified by Sigmund Freud. He stated that 'the demand that the
girl bring with her into marriage with one man no memory of sexual relations with
another is after all nothing but a logical consequence of the exclusive right of
possession over a woman which is the essence of monogamy."' (citing 4 FREUD,
COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (1925)); Rita Eidson explains, "The preferred rationale for

protecting only females and punishing only males has evolved from early exaltation
of female chastity and the special need to protect the 'weaker sex' to more recent
arguments that gender-based statutory rape laws are appropriate because of the unique
physical characteristics of females." Eidson, supra note 26, at 760.
50 Matthew T. Fricher and Kelly Gilchrist, Comment: U.S. v. Nofziger and the
Revisions of 18 U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea
Requirement of Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 803, 813 (1990).
Every jurisdiction maintains some version of the common law crime of rape,
which included sexual relations with a girl under the age of ten. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1 commentary at 323 (1980).
5'Fricher and Gilchrist, supra note 50, at 814.
2 Id.

53Statutory

rape is considered a general intent crime, and as such, no "mistake of
fact" defense is available. See State of Idaho v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220 (Idaho 1990)
(applying common law rule to bar defendant from claiming that he reasonably
believed that the victim was not 15, but 18). But see People v. Hernandez 393 P.2d
673 (Cal. 1964) (modifying rule to permit defense where defendant held "reasonable
belief" that female had reached the age of consent); Robert R. Strang, Note, She Was
Just Seventeen ...

and the Way She Looked Was Way Beyond (Her Years): Child

Pornography and Overbreadth, 90 COLUM.L.REV. 1779, 1783 (1990) (noting that
although courts traditionally have allowed mistake of fact defenses, courts have not
allowed the defense to be raised in cases such as bigamy and statutory rape); Bruce R.
Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM.L.REv. 1392, 1395
(1986) ("often, for the crime of statutory rape, no mens rea is required . . . thus
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"promiscuous," or both.54 The first of these claims was unsuccessful,
for it was not until 1964 that an American court permitted a mistake of
fact defense in a statutory rape case." Judges believed that when a
defendant intended to commit an "immoral" act, such as fornication, or
abducting a young woman against her father's will, his "guilty mind"
should preclude any mistake defense.56 But the defendant's moral
culpability which usually barred the defense of mistake, became
irrelevant where the victim was morally blemished herself, by having
engaged in prior sexual activity. The "promiscuity defense" exculpated
the accused if he could demonstrate credible evidence that the minor
had behaved promiscuously in the past. 57 This defense harkens back to
the notion of females as "special property"--i.e., as long as the property
is "undamaged"--i.e. chaste, special protection is necessary. Thus, by
extending legal protection only to virgins, early statutory rape law
served as a tool through which to preserve the common morality rather
than to penalize men for violating the law. As a result, it was legal for

disallowing the defense of mistake of fact as to the girl's age.... As the view that any
sexual relationship outside of marriage is always immoral becomes less widely
accepted, this exception to the general rule that mistake of fact is a defense has fallen
into disfavor," and comparing People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132 (1896), which disallowed
the defense, with Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 673); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith
Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 469 n.329
(1993) (noting that courts allowed the mistake of fact defense in Perez v. State, 803
P.2d 249 (N.M. 1990), which held that a defendant should be allowed to present the
defense, particularly when the victim affirmatively represents that she is of age, as in
Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964)).
' See infra notes 122 to 158 and accompanying text.
" The leading English case that influenced the American system to disregard
mistake as a valid defense is Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). In
Prince, the court rejected a reasonable mistake of age defense where the defendant
was charged with unlawfully taking a girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of
the father against his will. American courts adopted the Prince position until the
decision in Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 673. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
56 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCOTTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
411 (2d ed.
1986). It is interesting to note that had the defendant in Prince mistakenly believed
that the girl's father had consented to his "taking" her, the defendant would have had a
valid defense because he would not know his act was wrong in itself. Id.
" At common law, evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct was instrumental
in resolving three issues: The victim's consent; impeachment of the complainant's
credibility; and physical evidence of intercourse. James A. Vaught and Margaret
Henning, Admissibility of Rape Victims Prior Sexual Conduct in Texas: A
Contemporary Review and Analysis, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 893, 910 (1992). See also
ROLLIN M. PERKINS AND RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 207- 08 (3d ed. 1982).

For more on the current state of the law regarding the promiscuity defense, see infra
notes 122 to 158 and accompanying text.
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a man to have intercourse with a non-virgin, because society did not
consider his behavior morally offensive.
B. The Reform of Statutory Rape Law
The contrast between the promiscuity defense and most states'
persistent refusal to allow a "mistake of fact" defense shows that the
purpose of statutory rape law was to protect virginity, rather than to
punish men who coerce sex from young girls. The result of this agebased construction of the law, which only perceives as victims those
girls who have not yet been "violated," is that a male who has
intercourse with a seventeen-year-old female virgin commits a crime,
even if he reasonably believed her to be an adult. But if that man has
sex with a thirteen-year-old non-virgin, who could not possibly be
mistaken for an adult, he has not broken the law.
In spite of these paternalistic aims, feminists have a long history
of supporting statutory rape laws, and have successfully lobbied for
changes in the law throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
To understand the modern reforms in statutory rape law, it is
imperative to analyze the roles played by feminist reformers.
1. Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Feminists'Advocacy on
Statutory Rape
By the mid-1800s, statutory rape laws were supported by
Victorian feminists as well as "repressive moralists." 8 Victorian
grew out of concern over what some have labeled
feminist support
"social purity., 5 9 While this cause may sound moralistic and repressive
to modem ears, and while much of the rhetoric reflected an "obsessive
concern with the social and sexual habits of the poor,"' ° the social
purity movement pursued goals which easily fall within a modem
feminist and progressive agenda. In large part, the Victorian feminists
of the late nineteenth century sought methods for limiting the spread of
venereal disease and for "protect ing the young, particularly young
females, from sexual abuse."'" To this end, statutory rape laws were
seen as "preventive approaches to moral reform." 62 Early feminist
support of laws raising the age of consent for girls represented an
5 Olsen, supra note 45, at 403.
JUDITH R. WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VLCTORIAN SocIETY 246 (1991).
The social purity movement was a general assault on working class "immorality,"
characterized by activities which sought to educate the working class on the value of
chastity and sexual repression. See id. at 242-43.

'0Id.at 251.
61
62

Id.at 246.

id.
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important broadening of the Victorian feminist agenda, which formerly
had focused, in matters of sexual abuse, on "limited efforts to reform
and rescue the experienced prostitute."63
Victorian feminists saw youthful sexual activity as a tragic first
step in the transformation of girls from chaste maidens to "fallen
women," or, more immediately, child-prostitutes. 64 Thus, Victorian
feminists mobilized in an effort to strengthen statutory rape laws. One
such mobilization took place in 1885, when approximately 250,000
people gathered in London's Hyde Park to demand passage of a bill
raising the age of consent for girls from thirteen to sixteen. 6' The
alliance in favor of reform included feminists, as well as moralists
drawn from such wide-ranging constituencies as Anglican bishops and
Socialists.66 As Professor Fran Olsen notes, the law was "intended to be
an attack on male sexual aggression and on the double standard of
sexual morality. ' 67 The House of Lords opposed the bill. Its members
"openly supported the double standard," because they "wanted young
68
women of the lower classes to remain sexually available to them. ,
Feminist support for these reforms raised eyebrows among
some of the supporters' progressive contemporaries. For example,
when the coalition of feminists and "moralists" successfully secured the
passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, raising the age
of consent for girls, one observer commented, "It is . . . strange that
many of the very women who have braved insult and calumny in
demanding these rights were among the first
and loudest supporters of
69
the measure for their furthest restriction. ,

63 Id.

For a similar discussion regarding American women's parallel efforts circa

the mid-nineteenth century, see BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE
POLrrICS OF PROSTrUTION AND THE AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION 49-76 (1987).
', See generally WALKOWITZ, supra note 59; REGINA KUNTZEL, FALLEN WOMEN,
PROBLEM GIRLS (1993).
65 WALKOWITZ, supra note 59,
at 246.
66Id. at 246-47.
61 Olsen, supra note 45. Olsen explains the double standard as encouraging
sexual
activity among unmarried men but discouraging it among unmarried women. Id. at
402 n.70, 405.
6IId.at 403; WALKOWr'Z, supra note 59, at 250 ("[Vlery few of their Lordships.
had not when young men, been guilty of immorality. [One member of the House of
Lords] hoped they would pause before passing a clause within the range of which
their sons might come.").
69WALKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 247.
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2. Late Twentieth Century Feminists' Ambivalence About
Statutory Rape Laws
In the late twentieth century, feminists themselves became
troubled by this apparent inconsistency, and many voiced concern that
statutory rape laws amounted to state repression of female sexuality. °
This concern, among others, led feminists in the 1970s to oppose
gender-based statutory rape laws, arguing that they perpetuated
offensive gender stereotypes and restricted the sexual autonomy of
71
young women.
This feminist "about-face" reflected the influence of the late
1960's and early 1970's sexual liberation movement, which coincided
with the fledgling women's liberation movement, and gave the era's
activists, including its feminists, a decidedly "pro-sex" character. 72 In
1966, William Masters and Virginia Johnson published The Human
Sexual Response, which was widely popularized, and
7 3 marked a
dramatic change
the
female s
.
draati in chngein
he depiction
epitio of
offemlesexuality.

W
With
its

emphasis on women's capacity for sexual gratification through clitoral
stimulation, the book endorsed a new vision of sex. In their insightful
study of the sexual revolution, Barbara Ehrenreich, Elizabeth Hess, and
Gloria Jacobs reflect on the fusion of these two movements: "Masters
and Johnson potentially offered a new social meaning for sex, one that74
was more consistent with women's emerging sense of independence.
70

Olsen, supra note 45, at 404. See also Eidson, supra note 26, at 761 ("Critical

analysis . . .reveals no close correlation between statutory rape laws and female

vulnerability to vaginal injury or unwanted pregnancy. Moreover, young males are
also in danger of sexual exploitation by adults. . . . [Gender] classifications in
statutory rape laws are based on pernicious sex-role stereotypes, rather than physical
differences between males and females.").
71 Olsen, supra note 45, at 404. See also McCollum, supra note 44,
at 348-51
(discussing recent cases involving gender-based statutory rape laws); Id. at 350
(discussing Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir.1980), in which the court struck
down a gender-based statutory rape law because the state had presented no credible
evidence that the gender-specific law supported the state purpose of preventing
female trauma and teen pregnancy); Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Note, Whither
Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., The Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting
Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL.L.REV. 1933 (1992) (asserting that the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit gender-specific statutory rape laws).
72 BARBARA EHRENREICH ET AL,, RE-MAKING LoVE 73 (1986). ("[Tihe sexual
liberationist thrust of the [women's] movement protected it from the well-worn
psychoanalytic slur linking feminism to frigidity ....
You could not say, 'All they need
is a good lay.' Feminists were doing very well in that department, thank you ....).
"3"Between 1966 and 1970, articles about and occasionally by Masters and
Johnson appeared in almost every mass circulation magazine, from Redbook to the
Saturday Review; their book and a popularization by Ruth and Edward Brecher had
become best-sellers." EHRENREICH ET AL., supra note 72, at 65.
74 Id.
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The sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s was premised largely
upon a belief that sex was inherently good, that nothing about sex hurts,
and that women's sexuality was fundamentally like men's sexuality.
These beliefs are reflected in a popular book of the era: Everything you
always wanted to know about sex* but were afraid to ask. 75 The book
begins with the proclamation that:
[Hluman beings were designed by their Creator to copulate. An
active and rewarding sexual life .

.

. is indispensable if one is to

achieve his full potential as a member of the human race. Those
whose sexual behavior is shrouded in ignorance and circumscribed
with fear have little chance of finding happiness in their short years
on this planet. 6

Yet, the liberated sexuality encouraged by this best-selling sex
manual was phallocentric," heterosexist, 8 and predicated upon
women's subordinated status. For example, in the chapter on
prostitution, the author claims that wider accessibility to legalized
prostitution would reduce crimes of sexual violence:
If a dollar or so buys a willing companion, raping a stranger
doesn't make sense. Peeping, exhibitionism, child molestation, incest,
all feed on undischarged sexual tensions. • 79In countries where
prostitution is tolerated, these crimes hardly exist.
Then, having dismissed the "taboos" surrounding prostitution,
he suggests that prostitution's prevalence is entirely the fault of married
women.
" DAVID REUBEN, EVERYTHING You ALWAYS WANTED To KNoW ABOUT
SEX*BUT WERE AFRAID To ASK (1969).
76 Id. at 4.
7 For example, see EHRENREICH ET AL., supra note 72, at 48-49,
quoting Dr.
David Reuben on the subject of curing female "frigidity":
No woman deserves to be labeled sexually frigid unless her sexual partner
provides her with at least enough mechanical stimulation to trigger the orgasmic
response. How much stimulation is that? For the average couple, about eight minutes
of actual intercourse or seventy-five to eighty pelvic thrusts.
78 Lesbians are discussed only in passing, in the chapter
on prostitution. "Lesbians
are handicapped by having only half the pieces of the anatomical jigsaw puzzle. Just
as one penis and one penis equals nothing, one vagina plus another vagina still equals
zero." REUBEN, supra note 75, at 269. "Basically, all homosexuals are alike--looking
for love where there can be no love and looking for sexual satisfaction where there
can be no lasting satisfaction." Id. at 272.
" Id. at 249. In a later passage, the author describes a prostitution-related activity
known as a three-way girl. "Three (or more) men hire a three-way girl. They have
oral, anal, and vaginal intercourse with her simultaneously. It's great for the girl who
usually charges triple her usual fee plus as much more as she can get. Of course,
three-way girls have to charge more--they wear out faster." Id. at 254.
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Most . . .customers ...are married. Theoretically they have
access to complete sexual gratification with their wives. Realistically,
if they did, they wouldn't need [a prostitute] ...At least seventy-five to
eighty-five percent of the clients want to have their penises sucked.
Most of them feel compelled to explain to the girl that the only reason
they like it is that their wives refuse to do it. 0
Because the sexual revolution did not address women's
subordinated status, the changes it brought about were incomplete and
only partially satisfactory."
On the one hand, the sexual liberation
movement served to greatly expand societal notions of sexuality. And
by embracing its agenda, feminists broadened their constituency and
voiced the needs felt by women from all parts of society." On the other
hand, however, "orgasms, now that anatomy had been clarified, were
easier to achieve than equality."83 Moreover, the era's feminists
pursued sexual liberation for women as part of a movement which
ignored the fused nature of gender and status.
3. Modern Configuration of Statutory Rape Laws
The confluence of the feminist movement and the sexual
liberation movement helped to shape the reform of statutory rape laws.
The feminists further influenced those reforms by collaborating with
law-and-order groups to bring about comprehensive reforms of laws
governing criminal sexual misconduct. 4 This odd coalition aimed to
eliminate barriers to effective prosecution and conviction for rape, and
to protect rape victims both from the abuse inherent in the rape trial
process, and from the types of sexual assaults which were entirely legal
under old rape laws." Rape law reform encompassed a broad range of
issues, such as prohibiting the introduction of rape victims' sexual
histories, eliminating the resistance requirement, and broadening the
'0 Id.at 248-49.

"8See

EHRENREICH ET AL.,

supra note 72, at 198 ("Having come this far in our

sexual revolution.., we seem to find cause less for celebration than for ambivalence
and anxiety"); "If sex is 'free,' then so, potentially, are men; and women are left to
fend for themselves in an economy that still drastically undervalues women's labor..
[WIomen are more vulnerable than men to the hurts and dislocations of a society that
is sexually more free than it is just or caring." Id. at 199-200.
82 Id. at
71.
83

id.

Leigh Bienen, Rape 111--National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6
RTS. L. REP. 170, 171 (1980). As a result, the authors say, by 1980, every
state had considered, and most had passed, "some form of rape reform legislation." Id.
85 See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM.L.REV. 1 (1977) (describing the harms the legal system
inflicted on rape victims during prosecutions of their alleged attackers).
WOMEN'S
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law to permit prosecution for acquaintance rape, object rape, and
marital rape."

Because of the breadth and significance of the reforms in rape
law, reforms in statutory rape law were merely an afterthought. Unlike
the law governing forcible rape, statutory rape did not seem to cry out
for revision. Moreover, because statutory rape laws criminalized
sexual acts which could be mutually desired or pleasurable, they
seemed anachronistic to those who favored "sexual liberation." As
Fran Olsen notes, "On the one hand, [the laws] protect females; like
laws against rape, incest, child molestation, and child marriage,
statutory rape laws are a statement of social disapproval of certain
forms of exploitation.... On the other hand, statutory rape laws restrict
the sexual activity of young women and reinforce the double standard

of sexual morality."87
All of these factors combined to effect a dramatic revision of

statutory rape statutes across the country.

Presently, all but fifteen

jurisdictions have made the crime of statutory rape entirely genderneutral (i.e. applicable to a person of either gender who has sex with a

minor of either gender)."

Others elected to abolish the crime

altogether, by decriminalizing sex among teenagers.89 Among the
states that have adopted gender-neutral statutory rape laws, most

6 Chamallas, supra note 27, at 799.
" Olsen, supra note 45, at 401-02. This tension was described by Julie Hamos,
one of the five feminist attorneys who drafted the present Illinois Criminal Sexual
Assault Act, 720 ILCS 5/12-12 (Michie 1993). She recalls that the group began by
repealing the old rape law in its entirety. The team then began to create various
categories of offenses, which ultimately were classified into four categories: criminal
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or
aggravated criminal sexual abuse. When it came time to analyze the old statutory rape
law, the group felt ambivalent about its reenactment. Rather than focus on a gendered
notion of power in sexual relations, they decided to isolate and criminalize sexual
conduct which they felt raised a presumption of coercion. This conduct was then
incorporated into the criminal sexual assault and abuse laws using gender- neutral
language which penalized sexual conduct to varying degrees of severity, depending
on the age range between the victim and the accused. Interview with Julie Hamos,
president, Julie Hamos and Associates, in Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 24, 1994).
88 In Michael M., the court noted that over two-thirds of the states had made their
statutory rape laws gender-neutral. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 492. At the present time,
only Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri,
New Hampshire, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
and Texas retain gender-specific language in their statutory rape laws, under which
perpetrators are referred to as males.
89 Olsen, supra note 45, at 404.
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impose liability only if an age gap of two to five years exists and the
"victim" is under the statutory age of consent. 9°
Despite the widespread reforms in rape law, one vestige of the
common law statutory rape offense which the reformers did not
eradicate was the common law defense of promiscuity. As noted, at
common law, the accused was permitted a complete defense if he could
demonstrate credible evidence of prior promiscuous behavior on the
part of the minor.91 The Model Penal Code's statutory rape provision
preserves this defense, noting in the commentary that prior sexual
promiscuity "rebuts the presumption of naivete and inexperience" that
justifies the criminal nature of statutory rape.92
Initially the promiscuity defense reflected the law's desire to
preserve and reward a girl's virginity, 93 or as one modem court put it,
"to preserve the purity of females under eighteen years of age. 94 While
the term "promiscuous" is somewhat vague , judicial opinions on the
subject often contrasted "promiscuity" with "chastity., 96 Not all states
chose to classify any victim who was no longer a virgin as
promiscuous. Yet, many jurisdictions did, and some even codified this
presumption. For example, the 1975 version of Florida's sexual battery
statute, which criminalized sexual conduct with a person under the age
of eighteen, permitted a defense of consent, so long as the victim was
not under the age of twelve. 97 However, Section 794.05 obviated
consent as a defense if the child was "under eighteen, unmarried, and
previously was chaste." 98

90FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19, at 262.
9'Alston v. Texas, No.2-90-110-CR, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2366, (Tex. App. 2d

Dist. Oct. 25, 1991). See also William Wayne Kilgarlin and Banks Tarver, The Equal
Rights Amendment: Governmental Action and Individual Liberty, 68 TEx.L.REv.
1545, 1555 (1990) ("the [promiscuity] defense is available to an adult male accused
of statutory rape of a female"); Chamallas, supra note 27, at 789 n.56.
92 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 213.6(3) at 419-20 (1980).

9'Eidson, supra note 26, at 760; McCollum, supra note 44, at 355-56.
94Pawson v. Texas, No. 367-90, 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS
163, at * 14 (Ct.
of Crim. App. of Tex. 1993).
9'See, e.g., Rankin v. Texas, 821 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. 1991) (stating that the
promiscuity defense contemplates sexual activities that occurred prior to the alleged

offense, and that a "single other instance of a sexual act does not constitute
promiscuity within the meaning of the statute .... Promiscuity connotes a variety of
consensual sexual conduct with a variety of partners, continuing over a reasonable
period of time.").
96 See,

e.g., Alston, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2366, at *16; Pawson, 1993 Tex. Crim.
App. LEXIS 163.
9'FLA. STAT. CH. 794 (1975).
9
8Id.
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Modem courts not only continue to honor the promiscuity
defense, but do so even when the facts indicate that the victim's past
sexual activity reflects a degree of parental abuse and neglect. For
example, in Hemandez v. Texas" the court permitted the defendant to
raise a promiscuity defense even though certain evidence showed that
"the complainant's mother 'sold' the complainant to the defendant, who
also 'sold' the complainant to other men. '"00
Not all jurisdictions maintain the promiscuity defense, and
among those that do, not all equate promiscuity with non-virginity. Yet
even in those cases which attempt to differentiate promiscuity from
non-virginity, the ambiguous nature of the term "promiscuous" results
in an intrusive and value-laden inquiry into the victim's sexual past.' ° '
The court in Alston v. Texas recognized this. In that case, the
defendant attempted to invoke the promiscuity defense by introducing
testimony indicating that the sixteen-year-old complainant was not a
virgin. In evaluating the lower court's exclusion of the evidence, the
appellate court criticized the vague nature of the promiscuity defense:
While we may generally assume that "promiscuity" implies more
than one sex act with one partner, the court of criminal appeals
specifically rejected the Austin Court of Appeals' suggestion that
"promiscuity" means a "variety of consensual sexual conduct with a
variety of partners,".... In Boutwell, the court of criminal appeals
opined that, under sections 21.09 and 21.10 (citations omitted), a
defendant is entitled to have "any evidence which is relevant to the
issue of 'promiscuity' submitted to the jury"....... Promiscuity,"
being a somewhat relative term, is subject to varying interpretations
depending on many social factors. Different juries in different
counties may hold very different beliefs concerning sexual morality.
That difference could result in the same acts committed with the
same teenager being punishable as a felony in one case and not
punishable at all in another .... In statutory rape cases we should
not make the moral status of the victim subject to community
standards and define the crime on that basis.'

99
861 S.W.2d 908 (1993).
Id. at 910 (McCormick, J., concurring).
'oo
.0Note that the promiscuity-related interrogation of the complainant seems quite
similar to the treatment which complainants formerly received in rape cases-treatment which was abolished by rape shield laws. Of course, some might argue that,
unlike forcible rape, evidence of past sexual behavior should be relevant to culpability

in statutory rape cases. Such an argument necessarily reflects a view that past sexual
activity is grounds for denying some minors the protection of the law. This opinion
goes to the heart of the question of which population merits the protection of statutory

rape laws.

'02
Alston, 1991 Tex. App LExis 2366, at *16.
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Despite its critical insights, the court in Alston did not reject the
promiscuity defense. The court noted that, "The social policy behind
the present system is apparently the desirability of protecting the
chastity of sexually inexperienced teenagers against the more worldly
advances of experienced adults. Apparently, an adult is permitted to
have consensual sexual contact with promiscuous teenagers and not
with inexperienced ones."' °3 The court ultimately concluded that the
policy was sound, and that it should be the court's task to determine the
probative value of evidence offered to show prior promiscuous
behavior. '4
The promiscuity defense reflects a normative position on the
interface of sex, vulnerability, and coercion. This is evidenced by the
fact that homosexual conduct is not subject to it.'05 As the court in
Alston noted:
Peculiarly enough, the promiscuity defense is only valid when the
alleged victim is of the sex opposite than that of the accused. Since
homosexual sex is itself considered a criminal act in Texas, the
legislature apparently decided that the fact that a minor had already
promiscuously engaged in homosexual sex should not exempt him
from protection against the sexual advances of older homosexuals.
See Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985). .

.

. The peculiar situation created is that where someone

accused of having heterosexual sex with a teenager who was
promiscuous has a complete defense, a person accused of having
homosexual sex with a similarly promiscuous teenager not only
does not have a complete defense, he

. .

. remains liable for felony

punishment under section 21.11 or 22.01 l(a)(2).'0 6

This divergent standard indicates society's willingness to
exonerate men who select "loose" girls as sexual targets, but not those
who select "loose" boys.' 7 At a more abstract level, it reveals not only
society's views about "normal" and "deviant" sexual references of the
perpetrators, but also a sense of society's concept of sexual victimhood.
103

Id. at *17, *18.

104Id.

105
Id.at *15.
106id

'0'The United States is not alone in its ambivalence about young homosexuals'
capacity to consent. In February 1994, the British Parliament rejected a move to lower
the age of consent for homosexual men so that it would be consistent with
heterosexuals and lesbians. In defending his vote against the measure one MP said, "I
don't want to see old men queuing up outside schools in my constituency."
Apparently the men do not have to wait in line for female partners. The age was
ultimately lowered from 21 to 18. See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at A6; ECONOMIST,
Jan. 29, 1994, at 60.
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At its core, the promiscuity defense reflects a belief that, by virtue of
multiple sexual partners, girls become less vulnerable to coercion, and
in essence, gain the capacity to consent to sex. As one court put it, the
defense exists because "there is no longer any compelling need for
protective measures for the sexually experienced child."'
The
substantiated and dubious nature of this proposition points to a more
general and crucial failing of the reformed statutory rape laws: Despite
the reformers' concern for girls' equality, safety, and well-being, the
laws are riddled with questions arising from the unresolved debate over
the true meaning of coercion in sexual relations.
Such tension is inevitable, as Professor Olsen observed, because
statutory rape laws force society to choose between two mutually
exclusive goals:
Every effort to protect young women against private oppression by
individual men risks subiecting women to state oppression, and
every effort to protect them against state oppression undermines
their power to resist individual oppression.
Further, any
acknowledgment of the actual difference between the present
situation of males and females stigmatizes females and perpetuates
discrimination. But if we ignore power differences and pretend that
women and men are similarly situated, we perpetuate discrimination
by disempowering ourselves from instituting effective change. '

Seen from this vantage point, the statutory rape debate becomes
yet another incarnation of the ongoing debate between liberal and
radical feminism. 12' Those drafting the revisions were divided as they
Pawson v. Texas, No. 367-90, 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 163, at *14 (Ct. of
Crim. App. of Tex. 1993). See also Vaught & Henning, supra note 57.
,09Not only is there no reason to believe that more partners make a girl less
susceptible to coercion, but in fact, the truth may be precisely the reverse. Recent
medical research shows that a high percentage of girls who experience early teenage
pregnancy have a history of childhood sexual trauma. Catherine Stevens-Simon &
Susan Reichert, Sexual Abuse, Adolescent Pregnancy, and Child Abuse: A
Developmental Approach to an Intergenerational Cycle, 148 ARCHIVES OF
108

PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 23 (Jan. 1994). Thus, there is reason to

suspect that girls who demonstrate sexual promiscuity may in fact be survivors of
childhood rape and incest, and thus may be exceptionally vulnerable to abuse in
sexual situations.
110See Chamallas, supra note 27, at 814-15 n.165.
'" Olsen, supra note 45, at 412.
,,2 "Liberal" feminists generally call for equal treatment where men and women
are similarly situated; "radical" feminists argue that men and women are inherently
different but nonetheless deserve equal treatment under law. See Catharine
MacKinnon, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED at 32-45, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra

note 19, at 72-73 ("under the sameness standard, women are measured according to
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struggled to reconcile these competing notions. Some saw a continuing
need for these laws, arguing that teens--especially female teens--simply
are not equipped to handle the pressures and consequences of sex;
others disagreed, asserting that teen girls and boys are equally capable
of making informed choices in regard to their sexuality."' Ultimately,
the new laws favored standards of abstract equality. This preference
has had a profound effect on the way in which the law is presently
enforced.
C. Modern Enforcement of Statutory Rape Laws
Rape law in general, and statutory rape laws in particular, are notorious
as areas of the law in which "the law on the books.., differs markedly
from the law in action.' '1 4 Statutory rape law enforcement, both
historically and presently, has been sporadic." 5 As is the case with
many crimes, prosecutors--and some judges" 6--differentiate between
"good" and "bad" statutory rape cases." 7 The broad outlines of these
categories are discemable from both the prosecutorial and the judicial
perspective.
1. Prosecutorial Use of Statutory Rape Law
Statutory rape laws, although infrequently invoked, maintain a
unique and useful role within the structure of modem criminal sexual
misconduct laws. For instance, a statutory rape violation is an easily
documented offense if the victim is underage, and the perpetrator is a

our correspondence with man . . . Under the difference standard, we are measured
according to our lack of correspondence with him").
"3 This ambivalence persists and is prevalent in the debate among modem
feminists. See, e.g., Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal Law Course: A Survey of
Criminal Law Professors, 24 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 189 (1990) ("Other feminists are
opposed to or ambivalent about strengthening statutory rape statutes because such
protection also precludes a young woman from entering a consensual sexual
relationship, to which she may be competent to consent. These feminists view
statutory rape laws as more controlling than protective--and of course part of the law's
historic role was protecting the female's chastity as valuable property.").
"' Chamallas, supra note 27, at 778 (citing Michael M. v. Sonoma County
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 493 n.8 (1981), in which the Court noted that, "from
1975 to 1978, only 413 men were arrested for statutory rape, despite 50,000
pregnancies among underage women during 1976 alone.").
115 id.
16

7

See infra notes 129 to 158 and accompanying text.
Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault:

Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 213 (May 1991).
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certain number of years older than her, he is guilty." 8 This additional
conviction can add several years to a convicted rapist's sentence."9
Additionally, statutory rape laws permit prosecutors to seek convictions
in cases in which there is insufficient evidence to sustain a heightened
criminal sexual assault charge (e.g. felony rape) because prosecutors
lack proof that intercourse was nonconsensual.' 20 In these situations,
prosecutors can use modem statutory rape laws to seek convictions
2
which simply would not be obtainable under rape law generally.' '
Given that statutory rape laws are drafted as strict liability
offenses, it is curious to find their application so narrowed. Unlike
forcible rape, wherein the crime requires evidentiary proof which may
be somewhat elusive or subject to debate, statutory rape theoretically
only requires evidence of sexual conduct involving individuals of
certain ages. Yet, as revealed by the promiscuity defense, statutory
rape laws have never provided every minor protection from coercive
sexual advances by adults. Rather, the law traditionally has protected
only those minor girls who are deemed to require or merit protection-i.e., the "good" girls.

A recent, highly publicized example of this is a New York case
in which thirty-seven-year-old auto-body repairman Joey Buttafuoco22
pleaded guilty to the statutory rape of sixteen-year-old Amy Fisher.'
Though Buttafuoco could have been sentenced up to four years in jail,
he was sentenced to six months in jail, five years probation, and a
$5000 fine. 2
At his sentencing, Buttafuoco depicted Fisher as a
devious, experienced woman, calling his relationship with her "strictly
lustful sex," and stating, "She's no sweet little girl. She's a calculated

...
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 commentary at 385 (1980); see also
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19, at 292 (discussing the changes in statutory
rape law and noting that in many states the age range is five years).
"9 Telephone interview with Thomas Reick, Director, Felony Division, Cook
County State's Attorneys Office (Feb. 1994).
120 See Dripps, supra note 29, at 1788; Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 94.
2' Telephone interview with Thomas Reick, supra note 119; see also Frohmann,
supra note 117, (noting factors contributing to a willingness to prosecute in criminal
sexual assault cases).
12 After she had been arrested for shooting Buttafuoco's wife in the head, Amy
Fisher told police that she had an affair with Buttafuoco. She is currently serving a 5
to 15 year prison sentence for first-degree assault. Joey Buttafuoco Gets 6-Month Jail
Sentence; Amy Fisher Makes Statement in Court, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 16,
1993, at A9 [hereinafter Joey Buttafuoco].
,23Daniel Wise, Victim Impact Statements Seen Having Little Effect, NEW YORK
LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1. With time off for good behavior, Buttafuoco
could be released after serving four months. Peter Marks, Buttafuoco Is Sentenced to
6 Months for Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at B1.
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attempted murderess.' 24 Fisher's statement to the court at Buttafuoco's
sentencing'25 revealed a different image:
Your Honor, when this relationship began, I was not just a 16-yearold teen-ager taken to bed by a man twice my age. I was a 16-yearold teen-ager shown a world that I was not ready for, a world of
elaborate spending and fast boats. This man took me to expensive
restaurants and cheap motels .... I am sad to say that he taught me

well. He taught me to disrespect myself and to deceive my parents..
. If Mr. Buttafuoco had permitted me to cross the bridge between
adolescence
and adulthood unmolested, I would not be where I am
26
today.

Despite the age disparity and the disturbing implications
of
127
Fisher's testimony, Buttafuoco received a minimal sentence.
As the Buttafuoco case illustrates, modern statutory rape law
does not take into account the relative power of the parties engaged in
sexual conduct, and how that affects the capacity of each party to
consent to sex. Instead, a girl's ability to "invoke" the law turns on
whether she can demonstrate her own "innocence."'28 Moreover, this
"innocence" hinges on evidence of her prior sexual activity, rather than
on an analysis of the particular incident of sexual conduct which gave
rise to the criminal charges. By attributing sexual empowerment to
girls who have engaged in sex, the law turns a blind eye to actual
evidence of coercion and tainted consent. Instead, judges justify the
failure to convict by casting non-virgin girls into stereotypical roles of
sluts or temptresses. Three examples of this practice follow, one
involving intercourse between teenage peers; one involving sexual
contact between a step-father and his step daughter; and one involving
intercourse between an older man and a thirteen-year-old girl.

2 Joey Buttafuoco, supra note 122.
'2New York state law requires that in all felony cases victims be permitted to

speak26at the defendant's sentencing. Wise, supra note 123.
' Joey Buttafuoco, supra note 122.
.27
See Wise, supra note 123 ("For all the hoopla over Amy Fisher's appearance
last week at the sentencing ...her appearance was ordinary in one important respect:
it did not make much difference in the jail term Mr. Buttafuoco drew.").
128Of course, this is highly ironic, as the girl is the victim of a crime, and the state
is charged with enforcing the law. Another view of this is that the state's willingness
to enforce the law will turn on its perception of the victim's innocence. See
Frohmann, supra note 117.

2004]

STA TUTOR YRAPE LA W

2. Appellate Court Decisions
Perhaps the best known modem statutory rape case is Michael
M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 29 in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld a gender-based statutory rape law. In that case, a
seventeen-year-old male who had sex with a sixteen-year-old female
challenged California's statutory rape law (forbidding intercourse with
any female under the age of eighteen) on equal protection grounds. 3 °
The majority opinion does not discuss the parties or the facts
surrounding their sexual encounter. Instead, it focuses on the statute as
a weapon in the battle against the epidemic of teenage pregnancy.131
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion provides some factual analysis
in extensive quotes from the trial transcript. 2 After reviewing the
transcript, Blackmun suggests that the facts of the case make it "an
unattractive one to prosecute,"'33 since the victim was not "an unwilling
participant in at least the initial stages of the intimacies that took
place,"'' 34 the teenagers3 6 had consumed alcoholic beverages,'35 and the
two were close in age.1
Many legal scholars have taken exception to Blackmun's
assessment.'3 ' Noting that the record provides ample evidence that this
was not consensual sex under any definition,' 38 Professor Olsen
concludes, "The only consistent explanation for Blackmun's distaste for
450 U.S. 464 (1981).

129

,0 Cited by the Court as CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261.5 (West Supp.1981)
(defining unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse with a female
not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years").
Michael M, 450 U.S. at 466.
...
Id. at 466-76.
132Id. at 481 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.at 485 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'3'
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). It is unclear whether Blackmun
was endorsing
the practice of not prosecuting such cases, or merely acknowledging it, but the fact
that he uncritically categorizes this case as "unattractive" sends a signal to prosecutors
which legitimates the practice of reserving prosecution for cases involving
"attractive"--read "chaste"--victims.
137 See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 45, at 415-17; Henderson, Rape,
supra note 28, at
146-48; Chamallas, supra note 27.
' Olsen points to evidence quoted by Justice Blackmun that the victim had told
the defendant to stop, then, after the defendant slugged her in the face several times,
permitted him to "do what he wanted." Olsen, supra note 45, at 416, citing Michael
M., 450 U.S. at 485.
Even if such coercive measures could be deemed valid means of procuring
consent, the statutory rape law was, by definition, still violated: Females under age 18
were per se incapable of consenting to sex. A 16-year-old's "consent"--particularly
under such circumstances--should not have validated the act.
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the prosecution seems to be that Sharon did not fit the 'chaste and naive'
image associated with statutory rape victims.""' This explanation is
particularly disturbing since the victim's sexual history was not at issue
in the case: The defendant did not raise a promiscuity defense to the
Instead, he challenged the law's
charges brought against him.
constitutional validity, arguing that it serves to protect the "virtue and
' ' 40
chastity of young women," and, thus rests on "archaic stereotypes.
Justice Blackmun's comments arguably reflect not only his rejection of
that argument, but also his vision of how one might differentiate, on
one.141
sparse information, a virtuous girl from an unvirtuous
Similar views are seen in more recent cases
various state
142
143 from p-ahe
a
courts.
For example, in Pawson v. Texas,
a step-father was
convicted of sexually assaulting his fourteen-year-old step-daughter.
The indictment alleged that after the girl returned home one evening,
her step-father ordered her to undress and go into her bedroom so that
he could "check her."'44 "He had me take off my clothes and lay on the
bed, and he checked my genital . . . he took his hand and he was
rubbing on it. And he stuck his fingers in it and was rubbing around
saying that he was checking for something."' 45 Because the victim was
not a virgin, the promiscuity defense might have precluded a conviction
for statutory rape. Therefore, the state charged the defendant with
sexual assault, which required only that the sexual contact occur
without consent. 46
The Court of Appeals rejected the verdict and remanded for a
new trial. It held that by precluding Pawson from raising promiscuity
as a defense, the state "effectively robbed appellant of any recourse...

...
Olsen, supra note 45, at 417.
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472 n.7.
14'Despite the fact that the petitioner had not raised
a promiscuity defense, Justice
Blackmun identified the "[pletitioner's and Sharon's nonacquaintance with each other
140

before the incident; their drinking; their withdrawal from the others of the group; their
foreplay..." as factors particularly relevant to the petitioner's case. Id. at 483-84.
142 See, e.g., Pawson v. Texas, No. 367-90, 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 163 (Ct.
of Crim. App. of Tex. 1993); McBrayer v. State, 467 So. 2d 647, 648 (Miss. 1985)
reh'g denied. A somewhat more candid, but similar approach was taken in a recent
British case. Judge Ian Starforth Hill reluctantly sentenced a man to two years'
probation for having attempted to rape a nine-year-old girl. In handing down the
sentence, the judge referred to the nine-year-old victim as "flirtatious" and "no angel."

4 Ms., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 50.
141 1993 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 163.
'"Id.at

*5 (Clinton, J., concurring).
,45
Id. at *5, *6, (citing transcript I SF 129-35) (Clinton, J., concurring).
,46
Id. at *3 (Clinton, J., concurring).
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to parental discretion as a justification for his conduct."'' 7 Judge
Clinton, in his concurrence, elaborated on this parental authority
theory, noting that the step-father's "suspicions seem well-founded; his
' 4
stepdaughter admitted to certain prior acts of sexual intercourse."' 1
Then, in a bizarre twist, he added, "with the exception of evidence that
the defendant had a belt in his hand, there appears no other evidence by
which the State could prove that the penetration of complainant's sexual
organ with his finger was accomplished without her consent." 149
This hypothesis reveals the judge's assumptions about the
balance of power between the parties. His theory suggests that what
might constitute sexual abuse of a child becomes simply "parental
discipline" when the child is a non-virgin.'50 Alternatively, the judge's
theory might reflect his assumption that because she was not a virgin,
she most likely knew where her step-father was putting his finger.
Therefore, her failure to cry out or leave could be taken to indicate her
consent to the act. In either case, Judge Clinton's reasoning rests on his
assumption that non-virgin teenage girls simply do not need or merit
the protection of statutory rape laws.

141Id. at *7 (citing V.T.C.A. PENAL CODE § 22.011 (d)
(1) (Supp.1988)) (Clinton,
J., concurring). The court never explains how probing a 14-year-old girl's vagina fits
within any definition of parental discretion. Nor does the court explain what the stepfather expected to find. One assumes he was looking for her hymen, although it is not
clear why anyone would trust him to identify it accurately. According to at least one
gynecologist, the hymen can be affected by tampon insertion and athletic activities;
additionally, "palpation is extremely difficult in relation to visualization"--that is,
without proper training, it would be almost impossible for the lay person to
distinguish an intact hymen and one post-coitally. Finally, one can engage in sexual
intercourse and not rupture the hymen at all. Telephone interview with Dr. D.J.
Buckley Jr., M.D., March 1994.
,41
Id. at *6 n.3 (Clinton, J., concurring).
149 id.

,50
For an interesting colloquy on this matter, see Hemandez v. Texas, 861
S.W.2d 908, 909 (1993) ("It is quite possible to prosecute and convict someone of
sexually assaulting a promiscuous 14- through 16-year-old child ...by proving lack
of consent .... It is also quite possible to prosecute and convict someone of sexually
assaulting a 14- to 16-year-old child who consents to the sexual contacts ...however,
in such a situation, the Legislature has explicitly provided the statutory promiscuity
defense."); Id. at 911 (McCormick, J., dissenting) ("I fail to see the relevance of
evidence of a complainant's promiscuity in a sexual assault prosecution ...unless the
defendant makes the complainant's consent an issue in the case. . . . [One
consequence of the majority's interpretation of [the statute] is that in a future
prosecution .. .a defendant, who engages in sexual conduct with a 14-year-old,
nonconsenting, promiscuous child, will be entitled to an acquittal, because consent
will be irrelevant. These children will become 'fair game' for older, more experienced
adults.").
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An even more explicit endorsement of this position is found in
McBrayer v. Mississippi, 5 ' in which a forty-six-year-old defendant
sought to introduce evidence that his "consenting" thirteen-year-old
victim had been sexually intimate with two other men. The trial court
did not permit the defendant to raise the promiscuity defense because
he was charged with the unlawful fondling of a child under the age of
fourteen, and not statutory rape.'5 2 The court found that the promiscuity
defense was only available to those accused of statutory rape." The
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction, reasoning that if
the statutory rape laws did not punish the act of intercourse with an
unchaste child
under the age of fourteen, it was illogical to punish
' 54
"foreplay.'
Courts routinely inquire into statutory rape victims' chastity,
however virtually none of the cases discuss the circumstances of the
victim's prior sexual activity--even though judges who differentiate
between virgins and non-virgins should view this information as highly
relevant. For example, recent medical evidence indicates that early
teenage pregnancy, and therefore, by definition early teenage sexual
activity, is highly prevalent among survivors of sexual abuse.'55 Thus,
far from establishing "worldliness," a girl's prior sexual experience may
be evidence of her past and present vulnerability to abuse.
Despite the fact that statutory rape laws are premised upon the
belief that young girls are too easily coerced to effectively consent to
sex,' 56 they largely ignore the sources of girls' vulnerability, and the
relative power of the parties having sex with them. The law of
statutory rape, both on the books and in the courtroom, turns a blind
eye to what Professor Stephen Schulhofer has called "the kinds of
pressures and constraints that intrude on autonomous choice and render
consent ineffective."' 57 Instead, the law focuses on factors more readily
identified, such as age differences, and whether the victim was a
"virgin" or "promiscuous." This approach is compelling only if a girl,
,sMcBrayer v. State, 467 So. 2d 647, 648 (Miss. 1985), reh'g denied.

,52
Id. at 647; MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23 (West Supp. 1984). The court noted
that this statute "makes unlawful the fondling of a child under 14 by any person over
18 'for the purpose of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved
licentious sexual desires. . . .' Nothing in the child fondling statute requires that the
victim have been of a previously chaste character." McBrayer, 467 So. 2d at 642.
The statutory rape law was MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-21 (West Supp. 1984)-- consent
was not a defense. McBrayer, 467 So. 2d at 647.
"' McBrayer, 467 So. 2d at 648.
154
Id. at 648.
...
Stevens-Simon & Reichert, supra note 109.
156 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
117 Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 77.
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by virtue of becoming sexually active, suddenly gains all of the power
sex.151
and control necessary to give a meaningful consent (or refusal) to
II. ALTERNATE LEGAL PARADIGMS GOVERNING MINORS'
CAPACITY TO CONSENT
The modem application of statutory rape laws reflects a belief that
some minors possess sufficient maturity to consent to sexual activity.
However, this expanded vision of an adolescent's capacity has not led
to a reform of laws governing adolescents' rights to engage in other
adult activities. For example, both contract law and tort law remain
protective of minors, limiting the extent to which they will suffer the
consequences of their actions.'" Under contract law, minors may void
contracts into which they have entered; under tort law, the mature
minor doctrine provides a means by which minors may obtain
treatment for a limited number of serious medical conditions, without
first seeking parental consent.
A. Minors' Rights Under Contract Law:
The Persistence of Infancy
It is a fundamental tenet of common law that incapacitated persons-those who lack the power to participate meaningfully in the bargaining
process--may void their contracts.' 6° The law recognizes two categories
of persons who are protected by this rule: minors and the mentally
infirm.' 6' While the law relating to the mentally infirm has evolved in
tandem with contemporary medical understanding of mental

' Of course, if this tautology were really true, (girls are powerless until they lose
their virginity, at which point, they become fully empowered), it might be better to
encourage girls to lose their virginity by age 10, so that they might better protect
themselves from the hazards of adolescent sex.

Because this paper addresses the crime of statutory rape, it might seem that
criminal law provisions permitting juvenile defendants to be charged as adults would
constitute an appropriate frame of reference. While serious questions exist regarding
the wisdom and justice of such policies, as an analogy to the problems raised in this
Article, this issue ultimately yields little insight. The focus of the inquiry is on the
competency of minors to consent to sex, a legal adult activity, rather than on the
competency and culpability of minors who have committed a crime. Of course, the
two issues converge when a defendant in a statutory rape case is a minor, but since
this Article addresses competency among the victims, not the perpetrators of statutory
rape, this convergence falls beyond the scope of all but the concluding section, which
considers punishment and remedies.
160 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51 (1926); see
also JOHN
159

D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 8-1 (3d. ed. 1987).
161CALAMARI

&

PERILLO,

supra note 160, at 305.
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incapacity,'6 2 the law regarding minors' incapacity to contract has
remained constant.
The common law rule provides that a minor's contract will be
voidable at the minor's instance.'63 In essence, this means that a
contract formed with a minor will be valid and binding only insofar as,
and for as long as, the minor agrees to be bound by it. If for any reason
minors choose to void, or "disaffirm," a contract, they may do so,
pleading "infancy" as a defense against an action for breach.' 64 This
rule applies not only to wholly executory contracts, but also when a
contract has been fully performed, as when a minor has paid for and
received goods. 6 Under the traditional rule, where the contract has
been partially or fully performed, the disaffirming minor's only
166
obligation is to return anything that was conferred by performance.
Moreover, when minors have damaged or even destroyed the property
received, they need only return what remains.67 Today, some version of
this rule remains in force in all jurisdictions.

1

See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460

162

(N.Y. 1969); Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763
(N.Y. 1963).
163 See generally 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.4
(1990).

164id.

65 CALAMARI

& PERILLO, supra note 160, at 311 (noting that disaffirmance is

allowed so long as the disaffirmance does not result in a benefit to the minor and a
prejudice to the other party) (citing Adamowski v. Curtiss-Wirth Flying Serv., 15
N.E.2d 467 (Ma. 1938)).
S66Id at 315.
16' The most common exception to the common law rule holds minors liable for
the reasonable value of "necessaries" which were purchased by the minor--e.g., food,
clothing, shelter. FARNSWORTH, supra note 163, at 237. A minor has no obligation to
make a full restitution of benefits received under a disaffirmed contract. Id. at 234-35.
Additionally, some jurisdictions have statutorily modified the common law rule.
The most common reform has been to lower the age limit from 21 to 18, mirroring the
lowering of the voting age. Id. at 230. Another less common example is the statutory
rescission of minors' power to avoid contracts for student loans and insurance. See,
e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 281 (MCKINNEY 1988).

But see Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1983), reh'g denied 450 N.E.2d
254 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that a minor may not disaffirm a contract to which her
parent has consented, even where, as here, that consent is unlimited and therefore fails
to protect the child's best interests. The contract at issue involved the rights to nude
photographs of model Brooke Shields when she was ten years old. Her mother had
consented to unrestricted use of the photographs in exchange for $450. Six years later,
Brooke Shields sought to enjoin the future use of the photos; the court denied relief).
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Over the years, the voidability of minors' contracts has been the
source of some judicial consternation. As Justice Davies of the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York wrote in 1865:
A protracted struggle has been maintained in the courts, on the one
hand to protect infants or minors from their own improvidence and
folly, and to save them from the depredations and frauds practiced
upon them by the designing and unprincipled, and on the other to
protect the rights of those dealing with them in good faith and on
the assumption that they could lawfully make contracts.' 6

A century later, Chief Justice Kenison of the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire felt compelled to justify his enforcement of the rule as
follows:
A stranger must think it strange that a minor in certain cases may be
liable for his torts and responsible for his crimes and yet is not
bound by his contracts

....

However, the common law conception

that a minor does not possess the discretion and experience of adults
and therefore must be protected from his own contractual follies
generally holds sway today.' 69

occasional
Nonetheless, despite judicial ambivalence and
17
today.'
stands
rule
law
common
the
170
scholarly criticism,
The continued adherence to this protective tradition, in an era in
routinely are accorded the rights and duties of adults, 7 1 is
minors
which
v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526, 536 (1865).
v. Wilson, 209 A.2d 730, 731 (N.H. 1965).
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 163, at 228 ("[Tlhe law has tenaciously adhered
"70
'6 Henry
69Porter

to an arbitrary standard--the attainment of a prescribed age at the time of the making
of the contract--ignoring the obvious differences in maturity among individuals of the
same age."); see also Robert Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal
Doctrine in a Modem Economy, 1 GA.L.REV. 205 (1967); Walter D. Navin, Jr., The
Contracts of Minors Viewed from the Perspective of Fair Exchange, 50 N.C.L.REv.
517 (1972).
',In one recent case, Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1992), the court
permitted a minor to void a purchase of an automobile, but required him to pay for
depreciation due to willfully and negligently incurred damages. Interestingly, the
court struggled over the unfair result dictated by a strict application of the common
law rule. Thus, in a move designed to mollify and modernize the harsh results of the
common law rule, the court required the minor to pay restitution. In spite of its
discomfort with the result, the court never considered abolishing the old rule in order
to bind the minor to his contract.
72 Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (affording
minors privacy
rights, including rights attendant to procreation--or prevention of procreation); Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (the right to speak freely); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (the right to be free of racial discrimination;
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puzzling. Easy arguments may be made for viewing the rule as
anachronistic, because it seems to reflect a view of minors which is
entirely at odds with the expanded perception
of adolescent capacity
7
1
that characterizes modern statutory rape law.
Its persistence might best be understood by noting that, in
addition to reflecting a normative commitment to the idea that minors
deserve protection from their commercial follies, permitting minors to
void their contracts is preferable to the only realistic alternative: a rule
enforcing contracts made by those minors who demonstrate sufficient
legal capacity to contract. The latter would require that, upon reaching
some stage of maturity, the general principle of contractual capacity
would be triggered, and the minor would be legally bound to the
contract. As such, the rules of contract law would be applied to minors
on a case-by-case basis, and a person evaluating whether to enter into a
contract with a minor would be forced to engage in an assessment of
the minor's capacity to understand the proposed deal (or, more to the
point, how a court might assess that capacity).
This type of evaluation is fraught with subjectivity and
uncertainty, particularly since the method by which maturity is to be
assessed is utterly unclear. 7 4 Moreover, the contracting party would
face the ever-present risk that a seemingly fair contract entered into
with a seemingly mature minor would, in retrospect, be found voidable.
As a result, abolishing the presumption of incapacity might have the
perverse effect of limiting, rather than expanding minors' ability to
contract, because a prudent merchant would be unwilling to deal with
minors except on the terms to which the minor is presently subjected-e.g., requiring an adult co-signer."'

HOMER

H.

CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

310 (1988) (the right to own property). In addition, minors are held liable for their
torts, and are deemed capable of forming criminal intent. Id. at 312. Finally, minors

may be statutorily emancipated, thus able to enjoy rights that otherwise are reserved
for adults. Id at 327-28; see also Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes:
Emancipating Children in Minor Times, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 239 (1992)

(discussing emancipation of minors and arguing that often the process is used by
parents to their benefit and the minor's detriment).
173 The rule allowing voidability of minors' contracts is overinclusive,
since some
minors are more capable than others of managing their affairs. In addition, the rule
creates an arbitrary line, since many adults are not sufficiently sophisticated to protect
themselves against bad deals.
'74 See infra notes 177 to 217 and accompanying
text (regarding the ambiguities
inherent in determinations of minor's maturity and their rights to make health care
decisions).
17' EDWARD J. MURPHY

1991).

&

RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, CASES ON CONTRACTS (4th ed.
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The rule permitting voidability offers certainty to those who
would deal with minors. Presently, anyone who makes a contract with
a minor is on notice: the deal is never final until the minor, upon
reaching the age of majority, ratifies it. This rule does not seem to have
had an enormous chilling effect on those who do business with
minors, 1 6 because minors usually honor their contracts.
In addition to the efficiency arguments which justify permitting
minors to void their contracts, there is an obvious policy component to
the rule. The primary effect of applying a "mature minor" standard in
contracts cases would be to provide a route to victory for creditors
suing minor defendants for breach of contract. Given a choice between
holding young persons liable for unwise deals, to which they consented
perhaps in part out of youthful ignorance, and protecting creditors who
may knowingly have taken advantage of the minors, the law chooses to
protect minors. This is more than mere deference to precedent; it is a
substantive policy preference. Implicit in the rule permitting minors to
void their contracts is a judgment that commercial transactions are not
uniformly positive for both parties involved. On some occasions, one
party's profit may be gained at the other party's expense. But, should
that other party be a minor, she will not be held accountable. Minors
are legally unavailable for commercial exploitation.
B. Mature Minor Laws
During the same two decades in which reformers rewrote rape laws,
minors' rights to autonomous and confidential decision-making in the
health care arena grew exponentially. At first blush, the expanded
control which adolescents gained over reproductive health care
decisions appears to reflect precisely the same faith in minors which
inspired the statutory rape reforms. Yet, a close examination of the line
of cases which govern minors' rights to consent to treatment,
contraception, abortion, and sterilization, reveals that the changes in
these rights have been driven not by a sense that minors are mature
enough to make such decisions, but rather, by a belief that certain
forms of treatment are so important that the law should facilitate access
to them.
The common law position regarding health care treatment for
minors was that, until reaching the age of majority, minors lacked the

Edge, supra note 170 (arguing that the voidability rule should be abolished, but
actually proving that large portions of the market presently are dedicated to minors as
customers and clients in spite of the rule).
16
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legal authority to consent to their own care. 7 7 Thus, any treatment
rendered to a minor absent parental consent could subject the health
care provider to an action by the parents for assault and battery."' The
policy underlying this rule is reflected in Chief Justice Burger's opinion
in Parham v. J.R.: "'
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western Civilization
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children. . . .The law's concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience and judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. 80

The principal exception to this rule was that, in the case of
emergency, a doctor could treat a child of any age, even without
parental consent."' In such cases, the guardian's consent was implied
on the theory that any delay would jeopardize the minor's health. 8 ' The
other long-standing exception to this rule relates to emancipated
minors--i.e., minors who are not living at home, who are not
economically dependent on their parents, and whose parents have
surrendered parental duties.'
In the past, this category consisted
primarily of married minors and minors serving in the military.' More
recently, the emancipation doctrine has been used by parents who wish
to divorce themselves of financial obligations to their children. 18
1. Minor Treatment Statutes
Beginning in the late 1960s, evidence of the growing prevalence
of sexually transmitted diseases among teenagers led a number of states
to pass "minor treatment statutes.' 8 6 Legislatures passed these laws in
' Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D & C 309 (1933); see also ANGELA RODDEY
HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 124-25 (1986).
178
HOLDER, supra note 177, at 124-25.
,79
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
,o Id. at 602-03.
"'Luka v. Lowrie, 136 N.W. 1106, (Mich. 1912); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 279

N.Y.S. 575 (N.Y. 1935).
182 See HOLDER, supra note 177, at 125-26.
,8See supra note 172.
814
See, e.g., Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hospital, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y. 1966);
Swenson v. Swenson, 227 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. 1950).
..
5 See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 172.
116 Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decision-Making
for Children: An Analysis of
Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 689 (1982).
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response to the fear that teens would not seek treatment for
communicable diseases such as herpes and gonorrhea if they had to tell
87
their parents, or if their parents had to consent to treatment.'
Currently, all jurisdictions have laws which permit unemancipated

minors ranging in age from fourteen to seventeen to consent to care for
sexually transmitted diseases.' 8 8 Additionally, many states' minor
treatment statutes permit minors to consent to treatment for alcohol and
substance abuse treatment,'8 9 and to psychiatric care.' 90 Interestingly,
commentators and supporters interpret these statutes as an extension of
the emergency treatment exception to the common law, rather than as a

of the minors' maturity and capacity to consent to their own
reflection
191
care.

2. Mature Minor Exceptions
Minor treatment laws enhance a minor's power to consent in
only a narrow set of statutorily specified situations. As a result, minors
are frequently seeking non-emergency medical treatment to which they
are not statutorily permitted to consent. In recent decades, courts have
recognized a "mature minor" exception, which is invoked by judges to

grant minors permission to obtain medical treatment without the
consent or notification of a guardian.' 92 Even with the mature minor
187

HOLDER,

188

Id

supra note 177, at 130.

,89See, e.g., 410 ILCS 210/4 (Michie 1993), allowing a minor age 12 or older to
seek confidential treatment for sexually transmitted diseases and for alcohol or
chemical dependency.
190See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1498(d)(3) (1992) (allowing a minor 14
years of age or older to be hospitalized for "emotional disturbance").
19' See, e.g., HOLDER, supra note 177, at 130 ("the condition clearly constitutes a
medical emergency, since to allow the young person to remain untreated would
spread the disease."); see also AMA NEWS, April 17, 1967, at 4 ("It is ... better if the
physician can persuade the minor to inform his parents and thereby provide the
necessary consent, but where this is impossible and it appears that without the
physician's promise of confidentiality the youth will probably delay seeking
treatment, the youth's health is paramount to any other consideration.").
"2 One health law scholar, analyzing mature minor cases, has identified the
following factors which support the minor's right to consent:
1. The treatment was undertaken for the benefit of the minor rather than a third
party.
2. The particular minor was near majority (or at least in the range of 15 years of
age upward) and was considered to have sufficient mental capacity to understand
fully the nature and importance of the medical steps proposed.
3. The medical procedures could be characterized by the court as less than
"major" or "serious."
Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOOD
HALL L.J. 115 (1973).
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doctrine's explicit reference to "maturity," however, an examination of
the settings in which the doctrine has been invoked reveals that a
minor's level of sophistication is rarely a factor.
As early as 1956, case law made reference to a minor's maturity
in defeating a parental battery action against a physician who rendered

treatment to a minor child. 93 However, these were exceptional cases,
and it was not until the mid-1970s, when minors sought legal access to
contraception, that the mature minor rule gained widespread
recognition.' 9' As was the case with minor treatment laws, this push to
expand minors' rights was cast not in terms of the minor's actual
maturity, but instead, as a response to a public health threat--the
increase in teen sex, and the consequent risks of venereal diseases,
pregnancies, and illegitimate births.' 95
Further, those opposed to allowing minors access to
contraception did not base their opposition on an argument that minors
were too immature. Instead, they claimed that such access would
promote the rise of immoral 96sexual activity, and "destroy parental
control of the adolescent girl."

'9'Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp., 469
P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970); Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y.
1966).
94 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a variety of professional associations,
including the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and the American Academy of
Pediatrics, issued calls for the recognition of minors' rights to obtain contraception.
HOLDER, supra note 177, at 269; 1968 Report of the Family Law Section of the
American Bar Association, Report, Family Planning and the Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 103
(1967); Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 5556, June 20-24, 1971; see
also Elizabeth Jordan, A Minor's Right to Contraceptives, 7 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 270
(1974).
...
For example, the ABA's report couched its recommendations in light of the
evidence showing a rising number of "illegitimate" births. 1968 Report of the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association, Report, Family Planning and the Law,
1 FAM. L.Q. 103 (1967). The AMA's recommendation that teenage girls be given
access to contraception was offered "in the interests of reducing the incidence of
teenage pregnancy . . ." Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 5556, June 2024, 1971. As Holder states, "All authorities in the field seem to agree that the public
interest in holding down the costs of welfare as well as the interests of the individual
teenage girls requires that 'something be done' about the number of girls in their early
teens who have babies." HOLDER, supra note 177, at 268.
196 HOLDER, supra note 177, at 270. One outspoken
opponent of minors' access to
contraception was then-govemor of California, Ronald Reagan, who vetoed
legislation granting teenagers access to medically prescribed contraception. In
justification, Reagan stated, "Birth control should begin with--prior to marriage-saying no .... [This bill] represented the unwarranted intrusion into the prerogatives
of parents ... and would endanger the traditional vital role of the family structure in
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Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court decided the debate
over whether communities should permit teenage girls to obtain
contraception without parental consent.
In Carey v. Population
Services, International, '97 the Court held that minors have a right to
privacy in regard to procreational matters, and that that right outweighs
any state interest in discouraging sexual activity by barring access to
contraception." The majority viewed the case as following naturally
from its earlier decisions permitting married and unmarried women
access to contraceptives.'" Although the Court frequently refers to the
State's policy of discouraging illicit early sexual activity, at no point in
the line of cases permitting minors access to reproductive health care is
there any substantive discussion of a minor's maturity
••
200 or capacity to
contend with the consequences of sexual relationships.

3. Mature Minors andAbortion
By the time the debate over contraception reached the Court, a
far more contentious battle was raging over minors' access to abortion.
our society . . ." Neil Bodine, Minors and Contraceptives: A Constitutional Issue, 3
ECOLOGY L.Q. 859, 860 (1973).
'9"431 U.S. 678 (1977).
"9 Id.
at 692.

9Id. at 685 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) ("[Iln a field that by definition concerns the most
intimate of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to
prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive.").
'0o
Perhaps equally surprising, the decisions make no mention of statutory rape
laws which, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, criminalize sexual contact with
minors.
Permitting health care providers to deliver contraception to minor females may
put the providers between the proverbial rock and the hard place. Girls who seek
contraception while they are under the statutory age of consent, provided that they are
sexually active, are, by definition, victims of statutory rape. Thus, the provider has
medical information which relates to criminal activity. While medical information
ordinarily must be kept confidential, state laws mandate that providers report to
criminal justice authorities information which relates to the commission of a crime.
See e.g., 20 ILCS 2630/3.2 (Michie 1993) (stating, "It is the duty of any... physician
...
to notify the local law enforcement agency.., when it reasonably appears that the
person requesting treatment has received (1) an injury resulting from the discharge of
a firearm; or (2) any injury sustained in the commission of or as a victim of a criminal
offense."). A recent California case, People ex rel. Eichenberger v. Stockton
Pregnancy Control Med. Clinic, 249 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1988), illustrates this
predicament. In the Stockton case, the court held that health care, educational, and
other professionals are not required to report the pregnancy or incidence of sexually
transmitted diseases in a girl under age 14 if her partner is the same age, but the
professionals must report such occurrences if the partner is "a person of a disparate
age." Id. at 230.
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Almost immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade,20 ' state legislatures began passing measures restricting access to
abortion. Foremost among these were efforts to require parental
intervention in the case of minors who sought abortions. The
Massachusetts legislature, one of the first to enact such a law, passed a
provision requiring a minor girl seeking an abortion to obtain the
consent of both parents.
The Supreme Court found the statute
unconstitutional in two rulings, Bellotti 1203 and Bellotti 11,'0 4 and
instituted what became known as the "judicial bypass 2 5 requirement.2 6
In a long series of decisions following the Bellotti cases, the
Court has elaborated on the dilemma of the minor who seeks to obtain
an abortion without first consulting her parents. 07 In these cases, the
Court has both recognized the importance of a judicial bypass
requirement for "mature" minors, and has held fast to parents'
20
fundamental rights to influence the decisions of "immature" minors. 1
Nowhere, however, has the Court provided guidelines for determining
whether or not minors are mature.
In conducting a .judicial bypass hearing, the judge must assess
whether the minor is sufficiently mature to make her own decision
regarding the abortion. Initially, courts held that a minor is entitled to a
court order permitting an abortion, if she understands her situation,
understands the abortion procedure and its risks, and articulates a desire

20' 410

U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing women's fundamental right to abortion).
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 134 (1976).

202 Bellotti
203 Id.

204Bellotti

25

v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), reh'g denied.
The judicial bypass is a general rule that, while a state may require parental

notification or even parental consent of one or both parents prior to a minor's
obtaining an abortion, the minor must be permitted an opportunity to bypass that
requirement in a judicial hearing.
206In the Bellotti cases, the Court held that a state seeking to require parental
consent might do so only if it also provided an additional forum (the so-called
"judicial bypass") in which the minor would be permitted to demonstrate either that
she was sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision on her own, or that, despite
her immaturity, (or perhaps because of it) it was in her best interests to undergo the
procedure.
207See H.L. v. Matheson, 445 U.S. 959 (1980); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Hodgson v. State of Minn., 497 U.S. 417
(1990); Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
200Parents' fundamental right to rear their children in the manner they see fit was
recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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to have an abortion. ° Subsequent decisions have not elaborated on
this language. In fact, the Supreme Court's decisions ignore the issue
of how minors are supposed to demonstrate their maturity. Moreover,
in the event that a judge finds a minor to be insufficiently mature, the
cases require that the judge grant consent
for an abortion if it is "found
210
to be in the minor's best interests.,
While bypass hearings are largely a "rubber stamp" process, 211
the vague standards permit considerable judicial latitude.2 2 Even
though courts have spent more than a decade struggling with whether
and when a minor is mature enough to consent to an abortion, the bulk
of the legal analysis and focus is cast "not in terms 21of
3 protecting
minors, but in recognizing independent rights of parents.,
4. Mature Minors and Consent to Sterilization
Despite a plethora of cases which purport to turn on minors'
maturity, the case law granting reproductive rights to minors, like the
mature minor doctrine generally, rests not on an assessment of
maturity, but rather, on a calculus which permits minors autonomy only
when the treatment is relatively low risk, or when denying access may
cause the minor to suffer permanent harm. The state and federal
restrictions on a minor's right to obtain a surgical sterilization provide
ample evidence of this standard. In the late 1970s, various disclosures
of sterilization abuses--particularly the involuntary sterilization of
4
minor girls who were treated at federally funded health facilities_ -resulted in the promulgation of federal regulations precluding the use of
federal funds for the sterilization of any person under twenty-one years
219Belotti

II, 443

U.S. at 643 (1979), reh'g denied. HOLDER, supra note 177, at

288-89. For examples of early judicial bypass cases, see In re Mary Moe, 446 N.E.2d
740 (1983); Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699 (1983).
20 Belotti II, 443 U.S. at 630. The Court, moreover, instructed, "The judge 'must
disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based
exclusively' on that standard." Id.
2,,Hodgson v. State of Minn., 497 U.S. 417, 477 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
(noting that "only an extremely small number of petitions are denied," and that most
hearings last less than 15 minutes).
22 See, e.g., Ex parte: State of Alabama re: In re Anonymous, a minor, 531 So.2d
901, 903 (Ala. 1988) (denying a request for judicial by-pass to a pregnant 12-year-old
girl who was in state custody and sought an abortion. Her mother was
institutionalized for psychiatric care, her father's whereabouts were unknown, and the
judge noted only that, "from court-room observation, child is immature and not able
to make competent decision in this matter ....As child is only 12 years old and the
prognosis for delivery is fair, an abortion is not in the best interest of the minor.").
23 Belotti v. Baird, 393 F.Supp. 847, 856 (D.Mass. 1975).
24 See, e.g., Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F.SUPP. 1196 (D.C. 1974), vacated 565

F.2d 722 (D.C. 1977).
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of age." 5 Several young women, all of whom were dependent on
federal sources for their health care, challenged these regulations. The
plaintiffs, all mothers under the age of twenty-one, wanted to be
sterilized. Courts rejected their challenge, holding that the limitation
was both constitutional and reasonable. t 6
Given that the prevailing age of majority is eighteen, the fact
that the sterilization regulations set the minimum age at twenty-one
means that at least some of the girls and women affected by the
regulations are fully competent to consent to all other medical
treatments except sterilization. Thus, the sterilization regulations
reflect a belief that prior to age twenty-one, an individual lacks
sufficient maturity to make a medical decision which is essentially
irreversible. What drives the sterilization rule is a conviction that this
particular decision should be made only by those whose maturity and
capacity is unquestionable. The sterilization laws are but the most
protective example of a general rule that limits the autonomy of young
people, barring them from making medical decisions without adult
guidance. The laws permitting minors access to emergency care,
contraception, and abortion are narrow exceptions to this rule, and are
justified by virtue of necessity, not by the actual maturity of minors.217
Modem statutory rape laws, therefore, emerge as puzzling
exceptions to the legal system's general skepticism about minors'
capacity to consent. While the civil law either limits minors' ability to
consent to activities which may be risky, or curtails the negative
consequences which it anticipates will follow from minors' poor
exercise of judgment, the modem application of statutory rape laws
focuses on cases of non-consensual sex. Thus, the criminal law seems
to suggest that at least some minors are capable of rendering a
meaningful consent to sex. Since this perception conflicts not only
with the civil law view of minors, but also the entire common law
tradition, one would expect to find evidence which demonstrates that
minors are uniquely capable of wise decision-making in sexual
21 42 C.F.R. § 50.203 (1992).
16

Peck v. Califano, 454 F.Supp. 484 (D.Utah 1977); Voe v. Califano, 434

F.Supp. 1058 (D.Conn. 1977). See also California Med. Ass'n. v. Lackner, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 188 (Cal. 1981).
217 The one instance in which the law does grapple with the meaning and
implications of a minors' maturity arises when minors refuse treatment. See, e.g., In re
E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989), which involved a 17-year-old Jehovah's Witness
suffering from leukemia. The court upheld her right to refuse treatment on the basis of
deeply-held, family-shared religious convictions. Even though the decision ostensibly
deferred to the mature minor's autonomy, by situating its decision in the context of
her family's religion, the court tacitly required that the minor act in consonance with
her parents' wishes.
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encounters. However, a review of the current psycho-social literature
on adolescent
development, particularly
adolescent
sexual
development, indicates that minor girls are in fact uniquely vulnerable
to coercion and exploitation in their sexual decision-making.
III. A CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF FEMALE
ADOLESCENCE AND SEXUALITY
One way to begin an exploration of girls' vulnerability in sexual
decision-making is to revisit the Spur Posse incident." 8
The
investigating prosecutors found that, with the exception of the ten-yearold girl whose terror led her to acquiesce to sexual intercourse when
her assailant climbed through a bedroom window, the alleged victims
had "consented" to sexual intercourse with the gang members. This
finding raises a troubling question: Why would a girl consent to sex
with a boy who only wanted to score a "point" from her? While the
prosecutors did not raise this question, reporters were curious about it,
and asked the boys how they managed to lure so many girls into having
sex with them. The boys responded that they were particularly good at
an activity they called "hooking"--their name for the practice of
attracting girls through flattery. The boys described their "hooking"
techniques as consisting of approaching a girl and telling her something
along the lines of the following: 21"Oh--I'm
in love," or "Let's just
9
walk?,
a
for
go
to
"Want
or
cuddle,"
No one asked the girls why they consented. Perhaps it was
assumed to be obvious--sex is pleasurable, and girls, like boys, engage
in sex because it feels good. Yet this analysis is belied by the boys'
own descriptions of their behavior or sexual "technique" in these
220
encounters.
Moreover,
is considerable
research towhich
indicates
that girls do not
indulge there
in casual
sexual intercourse
appease
their
See supra notes 1 to 34 and accompanying text.
Cunningham, supra note 5, at 254; see also Michele N-K Collison, 'A SureFire Winner Is to Tell Her You Love Her; Women Fall for It All the Time', THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. Nov. 13, 1991, at Al (discussing a recent study of
college-aged men that found most admitted to having used similar lines on women in
order to obtain consent. Sample lines included: "You can trust me--I wouldn't hurt
you," and "I never met anyone like you before." One student opined, "A sure-fire one
is to tell a woman that you love her. Women fall for it all the time.").
220 See Allen, supra note 6, at 55 (reporting the Spurs' references to sex as "slam,
nut, pump, hit"); Id. at 62 ("It kinda gets boring sometimes, you know, just like going
over to a girl's house when you don't even care about her, no feelings, and you just
throw a couple of pumps and you're done, and you just go back home."); Id. at 128
("Whores you just nut and you leave."); Didion, supra note 5, at 50 ("[I]t's no
romance, you know, it's just--wham. You know, three and out.").
218
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sexual desires, and in fact, often report experiencing limited pleasure in
their sexual encounters.21
The ritual of "hooking," or obtaining a consent to sex through
flattery, is but one marker of the complex negotiative process
underlying sexual interactions. Boys seek sexual access to girls, and
their reputation is enhanced if they succeed in obtaining it. 22 Yet girls
consent to sex only in small part, if at all, out of sexual desire. While it
is clear that girls trade bodily autonomy, dignity, and reputation22 1 for
the attention and affection of boys, why they do so, especially under
circumstances in which they receive such limited attention and
affection as the Spur Posse boys provided, remains uncertain.
To the adult, this trade-off seems foolish at best, and dangerous
at worst. To evaluate the legitimacy of the criminal law's determination
to permit males to engage in consensual sex with minor females, it is
necessary to understand the reasons why girls consent to sex. This
understanding requires an exploration of current research on girls'
psycho-social and sexual development.
A. Girls' Psycho-Social Development
The publication of psychologist Carol Gilligan's IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE,2 4 a study of girls' psychological development, sparked the
development of a considerable body of research which has led to
greater insight into the socialization process by which girls become
women.
Although some commentators have raised legitimate
criticisms of Gilligan's work,225 it remains clear that, when she focused
her research lens on girls, part of what Gilligan revealed was a vast,
unknown continent in human understanding. Since its publication in
1982, the book has spawned a veritable cottage industry of academic
works in a host of fields. 6
22!
222

See infra notes 291 to 293 and accompanying text.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that nearly two-thirds of

teenagers surveyed believe that a boy who engages in sex increases his reputation, but
girls who do so suffer a decline in reputation).
223 Id.; see also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
text (noting that sexually
active girls are often called "sluts," but no such term exists for boys).
224

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).

supra note 19, at 52; Id. at 63 n.2.
Legal literature provides just one example of Gilligan's pervasive impact. See,

225FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE,
226

e.g., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19; Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution,

1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Patricia Cain, The Voices of Women: Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19 (1991); Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz, In a
Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal
Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858 (1992); Tracy Higgins and Deborah Tolman, Law,
Cultural Media[tion], and the Missing Discourse of Desire 33 n.60 (unpublished
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The most pervasive finding of the "post-Gilligan" psychologists
who have dedicated their research to the study of girls' development is
that among girls, adolescence is a time of acute crisis, in which selfesteem, body image, academic confidence, and the willingness to speak
out decline precipitously. 227
This result has been observed and
measured in a variety of settings.
In 1990, the American Association of University Women
(AAUW) surveyed girls and boys, evaluating gender-specific responses
to adolescence.
In one survey, which explored self-image and
perceptions of one's abilities, the AAUW researchers found that among
elementary-school-age children, 60% of girls and 69% of boys felt
happy with themselves. 229 By high school only 29% of the girls, in
contrast with 46% of the boys, reported feelings of high self-esteem.
The AAUW Report revealed that although both boys and girls
experience difficulty in adolescence, adolescent girls consistently feel
worse about themselves.23 ' The most precipitous drop came between
grade school and junior high.
Considerable evidence links self-esteem to diminished
academic performance. The AAUW survey reported that girls' greater
manuscript, on file with the author); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming
Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded
Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984).
Ramifications of Gilligan's perceptions are reflected even in modem fiction. See,
e.g., Margaret Atwood's CAT'S EYE, which, as a work of fiction, never "cites"
Gilligan, but displays a profound understanding of the cruelty and competition of
girls' cliques, within which girls both act out their loss of power, and mimic the
tension they observe in women's relationships with one another in a patriarchal
society; ELIZABETH DEBOLD ET AL, MOTHER DAUGHTER REVOLUTION 43 (1993)
(describing and explaining this phenomenon).
2. WELLESLEY CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, THE AAUW REPORT: How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS (Washington, D.C.: American Ass'n for University
Women, 1992) [hereinafter WELLESLEY AAUW REPORT] AT 11-13. SEE ALSO LYN
MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE CROSSROADS: WOMEN'S

PSYCHOLOGY AND GIRLS' DEVELOPMENT (1992); MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPEHILA:
SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS (1994).
228 WELLESLEY AAUW REPORT, Supra Note 227; See Also GREENBERG-LAKE
ANALYSIS

GROUP,

SHORTCHANGING

GIRLS,

SHORTCHANGING

AMERICA:

A

NATIONWIDE POLL To ASSESS SELF-ESTEEM, EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES, INTEREST
IN MATH AND SCIENCE, AND CAREER ASPIRATIONS OF GIRLS AND BOYS AGES 9-15

(Washington, D.C.: American Ass'n of University Women, 1991) [hereinafter
GREENBERG-LAKE STUDY].
229 WELLESLEY
230

Id.

131

Id.at 11.

AAUW REPORT, supra note 227, at 12.
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academic achievement in grade school begins to reverse itself in early
adolescence, because their declining sense of self begins to inhibit their
classroom performance. 2 The most commonly cited example of this is
girls' math anxiety: "Many girls consider mathematics to be their
favorite subject in elementary school, only to lose interest in
adolescence--and more important, they come to believe that they are
23 4
not good at it. ' 233 Further empirical research reveals a fear of success.
One way in which this fear manifests itself is in girls' reports of their
professional aspirations at varying ages. While girls often aspire to
occupations which carry significant power and authority when they are
young, they lower their sights as they progress through adolescence. 235
Psychologists have attempted to describe the psychological
changes which accompany these external markers of distress. 236 Their
primary research method consists of extensive on-sight interviews,
conducted at varying intervals over long periods of time. 237 The results
of their studies have been published in scholarly journals, 21' as well as
in the popular press. 239 Although these studies are both numerous and
diverse, several consistent themes emerge from them.
First, the literature describes adolescence as a time during
which girls confront "the wall"--a barrier created by a patriarchal
culture which values women less than men, and which objectifies and
commodifies women in sexual or reproductive terms.2 40 Girls approach
232Id. at 16; see also DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 10.
21' DEBOLD ET AL.., supra note 226, at 8. Additionally, detailed evidence from

schools indicates that girls are treated quite differently from boys. Girls are silenced
in schools by not being called on as often, and teachers encourage boys more and take
them more seriously. Id.
234 FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19, at 97 ("There
is some evidence that
women regard success as inconsistent with femininity and that 'the anticipation of
success, especially in interpersonal competitive situations, can be regarded as a mixed
blessing if not an outright threat."') (quoting Martina S. Homer, Toward an
Understanding of Achievement-Related Conflicts in Women, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
WOMEN: ONGOING DEBATES 169, 183 (Mary R. Walsh ed., 1987)).
235FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19, at 679.
236
DEBOLD ET AL.,., supra note 226, at 57-61.
237

i'd

238FEMINIST
239

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19; DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226.
GILLIGAN, supra note 224; DEBOLD ET AL.,., supra note 226.
240 See
Carol Gilligan, Teaching Shakespeare's Sister: Notes from the
Underground of Female Adolescence, in MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL
WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL 6-29 (Carol Gilligan et
al. eds., 1990). See also DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 11 (summarizing this
analogy as follows: "To get through the wall, girls have to give up parts of themselves
to be safe and accepted within society. Once through the wall, it becomes hard to
recognize its structure as anything but 'reality.' . . . [G]irls give up relationships--with
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the wall gradually. In childhood, girls typically express themselves
with what psychologist Annie Rogers calls " the courage to speak one's
'
mind by telling all one's heart. 241
They speak directly, confidently
expressing their thoughts, feelings, and desires.2 Yet, as girls' bodies
begin to change, their self-images change. 43 Perhaps the most
significant external manifestation of girls' contact with the wall is their
increasing unwillingness to speak their opinions or voice their desires.
The phenomenon is psycho-social. Girls equate compliance and
cooperation with "niceness," and they perceive that being nice is central
to being "feminine."24
Aside from diminished self-esteem and a desire to be perceived
as "feminine," the reaction to the physical process of becoming a
woman also contributes to girls' insecurity. Most girls view the
physical changes of adolescence--the complete alteration of the body's
shape--not as an empowering experience, but as a loss of control. 45 As
they reach puberty, girls become objects of male desire, and the
experience of seeing and valuing (or devaluing) themselves through the
eyes of others is a traumatic one.246 Girls are portrayed as legitimate
targets of male sexual desire. This is largely evidenced in both
advertising and television programming. ournalist Marilyn Duff traced
the modem history of this phenomenon, beginning with Hollywood's
commercial exploitation of young girls as sexual objects. 247 The 1956
release of Elia Kazan's "Baby Doll," and subsequent movie hits such as
"Lolita" in 1962, "Taxi Driver" in 1976, "Pretty Baby" in 1978, and
"Manhattan" in 1979 illustrate this phenomenon. Duff comments:
In the ensuing years, films aimed at kids and adults alike have
showcased this sexuality of children .... But films get plenty of help
from other media in exploiting children. . . . This year's fashion

showings in Paris scandalized the audience by having very young girl
models parade the runway in see-through minis with no underwear.
themselves and their own knowledge, desires, and needs--to secure relationships as
prescribed in patriarchal culture.").
24, Id. at 94 (quoting ANNIE G. ROGERS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF COURAGE IN
GIRLS AND WOMEN 43, 30 (1989)).
242 id.
243id.

244

DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 53, 93-94; DANA CROWLEY

JACK,

SILENCING THE SELF: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION (1991); WELLESLEY AAUW REPORT

supra note 227, at 12.
245DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 50.
246 Id. at 48 ("Girls are powerless to stop themselves from entering the culture as
women, and this experience is deeply traumatic.").
247 Marilyn Duff, Media Rob Children of Innocence, ST. LouIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 27, 1993, at 13B.
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And pre-teen sections of major department stores offer spandex
miniskirts, underwear as outerwear, net stockings and bustiers that
would warm the heart of the most experienced hooker.248
Additionally, Duff cites TV sit-coms, such as "Married... With
Children," which "features a promiscuous teen daughter as an ongoing
'gag'," and MTV rock videos, which "frequently use children and teens
in scenes of violence or sex," as evidence that "[[t]he image of
children's innocence is being systematically
stamped out in the minds
249
of adults as well as children themselves.,
These factors work to jeopardize girls' ability to protect
themselves from unwanted physical contact. As boys and girls enter
adolescence, playful means of expressing admiration or curiosity
evolve into ominous "games" of sexual harassment. Boys stop playing
games like "cooties," and begin to engage in brassiere-snapping, "titty
twisting," and worse.2 ' As one researcher notes:
Given the kinds of sexual harassment and power plays common in
the school playground, it should not surprise us that as she develops
her social (gender) identity, a young teenage woman is less likely to
experience herself as an active agent with a body that belongs to
her, inseparable from herself, fundamental to her very existence,
than is a young man of a similar age."'

Thus, one of the most insidious aspects of girls' psycho-social
development is that they become less certain of their physical
248 Id

241Id.;

see also Marion Hume, When Fashion is No Excuse At All, THE
INDEPENDENT, May 26, 1993, at 22 (criticizing VOGUE magazine for running a
series of photographs of 19-year-old model Kate Moss looking like: "[A]
prepubescent child wearing the semi-see-thru sexy underwear of a knowing adult,"
and comparing the Moss ads to ads featuring more womanly looking models: "The
crucial difference is that [those adult-looking models] have the bodies of women, and
thus, one could infer, the minds too. Moss might be a smart young businesswoman in
control of her destiny, her earnings, and her relationships, but that is not what the
pictures show. Instead, they add to the invidious process of robbing children of their
innocence.").
250One 12-year-old girl recently described an activity that the boys at her school
call "pantsing." A boy approaches a girl, usually from behind, and tugs her pants
down to her ankles. When performed "successfully," the attack leaves the girl
humiliated and paralyzed, unable to pursue her aggressor, or even to walk until she
gets her pants up again. Telephone interview with E. (Dec. 1993). See also DEBOLD
ET AL., supra note 226, at 50 (noting that well over one-third of school-age girls
reported being harassed every single day in school, and 80% reported having been
touched, pinched or grabbed).
25! Annette Lawson, Multiple Fractuers: The Cultural Construction of Teenage
Sexuality and Pregnancy, in THE POLITICS OF PREGNANCY 101, 104 (Annette Lawson

& Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993).
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boundaries and less able to declare their own limits, at precisely the
time at which they begin to explore their own sexuality. The
implications of this convergence of bodily maturity and moral
dispossession are particularly disturbing because male sexual initiative
remains a societal norm.252
B. Sex and the Teenage Girl
Several years ago, the federal government determined that the lack of
knowledge regarding teenage sexual practices was impeding
government efforts to formulate sex-education programs, to devise
policies targeted at lowering rates of sexually transmitted diseases
(including HIV), and to counter the trend toward teenage
motherhood. 253 As a result, the government proposed a multi-million
dollar study to survey adolescent sexual practices. However, shortly
before the scheduled start-up date, conservative Congressional leaders
sharply criticized the study, claiming that it condoned sexual activity
among teenagers.2 4 Ultimately, the study was cancelled. 255 Thus,
understanding teenage sexuality requires researchers to rely upon
scattered information, such as surveys, narrow academic studies, and
teens' own stories.
1. Statistical Data on Sexual Activity
A dramatic shift in societal norms regarding female sexuality
has occurred in the past several decades. Numerous studies confirm
that growing numbers of teenage girls are engaging in sexual activity,
256
birthday.
and more than half have intercourse before their eighteenth
These studies also demonstrate that teenage girls are more likely to be

See supra notes 186 to 191 and accompanying text; see also NAOMI WOLF,
THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN (1991).
25' Dan Weikel, Dannemeyer Raps Bush on AIDS Stance, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1992,254at A23.
252

id.

Id. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Rep. William E. Dannemeyer (R-Fullerton,
Calif.) "[used] their clout to block federally backed educational programs designed to
promote safe sex practices and research into sexual behavior that might contribute to
the transmission of AIDS." Id.
255

256

ALAN GUT'MACHER INSTITUTE, SEX AND AMERICA'S TEENAGERS (1994).

82%

percent of all teenagers are sexually experienced. Id. Among women aged 15- 19,
53% had had sexual intercourse. Henshaw, supra note 31, at 86. Other sources report
even higher incidents of sexual activity: three-quarters of American teens having had
sex by the time they reach age 20; of sexually active girls, 61% have had multiple
partners, up from 38% in 1971; and among 15-year-olds, one-third of boys and 27%
of girls have had sexual intercourse. Gibbs, supra note 13, at 60.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol.8.1:109

257
sexually active at younger ages than teens in years past..
As sexual

activity among adolescents has increased, the statistical variation along
gender, class, and race lines2.. has nearly disappeared. Today, teenage
girls are almost as likely as teenage boys to be sexually active before
marriage,'5 and the gap between whites and minorities is rapidly
closing.2' 6 Evidence from the 1953 Kinsey Report, which indicated that
individuals from higher class backgrounds engaged in premarital sex
less often and later than individuals from lower class backgrounds, is
no longer accurate. 261
As the number of sexually active teenagers grows, the age at
which young people first marry is also increasing.
Thus, as
sociologist Kristin Luker noted in a recent article, 263 "as the age at first
marriage has risen and the age at first intercourse has dropped, teen
sexuality has changed."' 64 Luker
•
posits .that,
because most people
261
perceive their relationships as impermanent, teenage sex is inherently
based "in pleasure, note procreation, and in short-term relationships
rather than as a prelude to marriage. 2 66 This insight resonates with the
Spur Posse portrayal of casual sexual encounters, and explains why the
boys did not need to promise marriage to induce consent. It does not,
however, reveal anything about why the girls "consented," nor whether
they found the sex to be pleasurable.
2. Double-Standards and the Double-Bind in Action
Despite the fact that "a majority of Americans no longer view
premarital intercourse as wrong, and the media bombards teens with
257One

survey reported that the rate of sexual activity outside of marriage for

teenage girls in the 1950s was 38.9%; by the 1970s this had increased to 68.3%. S.L.
Hofferth et al., Premarital Sexual Activity Among United States Teenage Women of
the Past Three Decades, 19 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 46-53 (1987).
25

Kristen Luker, Dubious Conceptions; The Controversy Over Teen Pregnancy,

THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Spring 1991, at 73.
259

Id. at 78.

260Higgins
26, Luker,
262 Id. at

and Tolman, supra note 226, at 11; Luker, supra note 258, at 75.
supra note 258, at 78.
75 ("Since 1970 young women have increasingly postponed marriage

without rediscovering the virtues of chastity."). Luker reports that the number of
married teens has dropped from 12% in 1970 to 6% in 1984, while the number of
sexually active unmarried teens increased from 25% in 1970 to nearly 50% in 1984.
263 Id. at 78.
264 Id.

261 Id.

at 79. Luker notes statistics on age at first marriage indicate that, by
definition, teenagers engaged in sexual relationships are "too young to 'get serious'."
Id. 266/d.
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scenes of sexual involvement and innuendo,"' 267 remarkably little has
changed in the way that society regards sexually-active girls.
Ironically, the double-standard by which society encourages male
sexuality and stigmatizes female sexuality 268 persists even into an era in
which most teenage girls are sexually active. 269 The effect on girls is to
surround the issue of sexuality with enormous ambivalence and shame.
This is evidenced in two contexts: first, in teenage girls' behavioral
resistance to contraceptive use, 270 and second, in the marked absence of
any affirmative "discourse of desire" among sexually active teenage
girls. 7
a. Teen PregnancyandAbortions Rates
The statistics regarding teenage sexual activity might lead some
persons to assume that the sexual double-standard is obsolete.
Plainly, the availability of effective contraceptive methods and legal
abortion has contributed to the emergence of a more permissive norm
regarding teenage female heterosexual activity. Yet, rates of teen
pregnancies and abortion remain constant.7 3 These rates provide ample
evidence that girls are having intercourse without contraception even
though they do not wish to conceive.
This paradox hints at
countervailing factors which militate against contraceptive use.
Despite the fact that contraception is indispensable for a female
who wants to have intercourse but does not wish to conceive,

267

Deborah L. Rhode, Adolescent Pregnancy and Public Policy, in THE POLITICS

OF PREGNANCY 301, 316 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993).
268See supra notes 11, 67 to 69 and accompanying text.
269Miriam Miedzian, Boys will be Boys: Breaking the Link Between Masculinity
and Violence, TIME, Jan. 1994.
270 Barbara
Bennett, Generations, ST. Louis

POST-DISPATCH,

EVERYDAY

MAGAZINE, May 6, 1991, at 4D (noting that many sexually active teenage girls do not
use birth control because to do so would be to accept themselves as sexually active
and therefore not a "good girl."). See also infra notes 272 to 276 and accompanying
text.
271 See infra notes 288 to 301 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 256 to 261 and accompanying text (discussing increasing
sexual activity among teen girls).
273Henshaw, supra note 31, at 96 ("Although overall abortion rates have declined
slightly in recent years, both abortion rates and birth rates have increased markedly
since 1984 among minority women aged 15-30."). Henshaw also reported that while
the incidence of sexual intercourse increased from 45% to 53% between 1982 and
1988 among white female teens aged 15-19, the pregnancy rate among those teens
decreased; among minority women of that age, the pregnancy rate increased "even
though the proportion of sexually active women remained virtually unchanged." Id. at
86.
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contraception
is simply not considered by teenagers to be a part of
274
"sex."

As one commentator notes:

Sex is often presented as a goal in and of itself, with little
discussion of its risks or of responsible contraceptive behavior....
Female adolescents remain subject to a double standard that makes
spontaneous intercourse seem acceptable
25 but suggests that adequate
preparation is evidence of promiscuity.

Contraception has a stigma attached to it. It implies that the girl
not only anticipated sex, but was prepared for sex, which, in the
'
language of the double-standard, makes her "easy."276

Thus, for a

sexually active teenage girl, the double-standard produces a doublebind when it comes to contraception.277
If she does not use
contraception, a girl risks conceiving and having to make the painful,
costly, and enormously difficult decisions surrounding an unplanned
pregnancy; if she is prepared to use contraception, she violates the
double-standard, requiring her to play a passive role in spontaneous
sexual encounters.278
Further, the option of sexual abstinence is not necessarily
viable. Girls who resist sex are stigmatized by their peers as "frigid,

cocktease, and lesbian. 2 79

Thus, girls experience a double-bind

situation in which "options are reduced to a very
few and all of them
28 0
expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation. ,

274Fine,
275

supra note 21, at 31.

Rhode, supra note 267, at 316.

DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 53. A girl or a woman who carries
contraception is perceived as having consented to sex. This assumption is so
profoundly rooted that a grand jury refused to issue a rape indictment against a man
who broke into a woman's house and demanded sex from her at knifepoint. Their
reasoning? Defense counsel speculated that because the victim asked the assailant to
wear a condom, consent to intercourse could be implied. Ross E. Milloy, Furor Over a
Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 25, 1992, § 1, at 30.
A second grand jury did indict the man, and he was later found guilty of
aggravated sexual assault. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Rapist Who
Agreed to Use Condom Gets 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1993, § 1, at 6.
...
For more on the double-bind generally, see Marilyn Frye, The Double-Bind,
THE POLITICS OF REALITY (1973).
...
As a result of this perception, the average sexually active teenage girl has been
having intercourse for six months by the time of her first visit to a clinic for
contraception. The percentage of teenagers using contraception at first intercourse is
less than 50%. Henshaw, supra note 31, at 86.
"9 MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 3
(1983).
280 Id. at 2.
276
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b. Fearand Desirein Teenage Sexuality
Given the combined effects of girls' loss of voice, of the double
standard's conscription of girls into a passive role in sexual encounters,
and of the association between sex and risks of unwanted pregnancy, it
is not surprising that girls seldom articulate positive feelings about
sexual desire. Recently, researchers have begun talking to teenage girls
about their sexual experiences and have documented a phenomenon
they term the "missing discourse of desire., 28 ' Actually, the discourse
is absent on two levels: First, in the messages society conveys
regarding girls and sexuality2 2 and second, in the girls' self-reported
experiences of sexual pleasure and desire. 3
The information girls receive about sex is fused with messages
of fear and danger. As psychologist Deborah Tolman notes, "Even
adults who are willing or able to acknowledge that girls experience
sexual feelings often struggle with the fact that desire is dangerous for
girls. Full knowledge of their sexual feelings will get girls into
situations where they will be vulnerable--to rape or violation, to
pregnancy, to AIDS .... ,,284 This fusion of sex and fear emerges as a
key theme in Michelle Fine's study of sex education classes in New
York City public school classrooms.
That study documents the
discourse of
victimization and danger that permeates the sex education
28 5
curriculum.
The dangers associated with sexual activity are real, and they
tend to fall unequally on girls. 6
Debold summarizes the
interconnection between sex and violence for girls as follows:
For most girls, their awareness of and exposure to physical danger
becomes acute in adolescence (although many girls have learned
hard lessons about violence, particularly sexual violence, at a very
young age). Of girls who have been sexually abused, the greatest
28, Fine,
282 See

supra note 21; Higgins and Tolman, supra note 226.

supra note 18.

283

See infra notes 291 to 296 and accompanying text.

2"

Tolman, supra note 21, at 26.

25

Fine, supra note 21, at 32. ("To avoid being victimized, females learn to

defend themselves against disease, pregnancy, and 'being used'.

. .

. The language, as

well as the questions asked and not asked, represents females as the actual and
potential victims of male desire.").
286DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 50 ("As girl's bodies awaken to the powers
and pleasures of adult sexual feeling, girls desire to experience something deeply
moving, to be deeply moved. But the sexualized images of women around them, the
stories of violence and rape, the difference between men's and women's physical
power, and the comments and stares of boys and men all come together to make very
different sense of the world ....

Adolescent girls are simply not safe in their bodies,

and most of the danger has to do with sex.").
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number were eleven years old when such abuse first occurred.
While one in three girls acknowledges an unwanted sexual contact
before age 18 with an adult male, three-fourths of that unwanted
contact occurs during adolescence. In fact, psychiatrist Judith
Herman writes that rape might be thought of as girls' "social rite...
of initiation into the coercive violence at the foundation of adult
society." As many as one-third of all high school and college-age
girls are involved in violence in an intimate or dating relationship." 7

This emphasis on danger, together with society's insistence that
girls are "responsible" for maintaining control over sexual interactions
by saying "no," by using contraception,"' and by bearing full
responsibility for any pregnancy that results from sexual intercourse,' 9
fails to yield an image of "a good and normal" sexually active teenage
girl.2 90

As a result, it is not surprising that girls do not speak openly of
sexual desire. A girl who embraced those desires would risk being
labelled promiscuous. Still, since a large number of girls are sexually
active, it is conceivable that in a safe setting, and perhaps by general
references, rather than personal illustrations, girls would express sexual
desire. However, this is not the case. 9 ' Instead, girls seem to view
pleasure as something which their partners derive from them,292 or as
something that results from their giving pleasure to others.293

27

d. at 51.

288Henderson,

Rape, supra note 28.
discussions regarding teen pregnancy refer to girls, rarely, if

289Interestingly,

ever, to boys. See Males, supra note 18.
290 Tolman, supra note 21, at 8.
291Researcher Sharon Thompson began exploring this issue in 1984, and has
completed the most comprehensive empirical study of this issue to date. Her works
consist of interviews with over 400 girls about their experiences of sexuality,
romance, contraception, and pregnancy. Her findings indicate that, despite the fact
that the girls were sexually experienced, their descriptions of their experiences did not
describe any personal sexual pleasure or sexual desire. Tolman, supra note 21, at 3, 5;
Fine, supra note 21, at 36-37.
292 Id.;

Katha Pollitt, Not Just Bad Sex, THE NEW YORKER, 1994, at 220, 224

(discussing Katie Roiphe's referring "with approval [to] a friend who tells off obscene
phone callers by informing them that she was her high school's 'blow-job queen.' Not
to detract from that achievement, but one wonders at the unexamined equation of
sexual service and sexual selfhood. Do campus bad girls still define their prowess by
male orgasms rather than their own?").
293 It seems that "pleasing others often translates into having sex." Perry, supra
note 18.
This phenomenon--that girls' pleasure lies in giving pleasure to others--is
consistent with the socialization of girls to think of others first, to be peacekeepers,
etc. See generally DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226.
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To explore this issue more thoroughly, psychologist Deborah
Tolman conducted a series of in-depth interviews with a broad crosssection of sexually active teenage girls.294 Tolman found that two-thirds
of the girls interviewed expressed sexual desire, but fused that desire
with fear of the repercussions which sexuality might bring--i.e.,
diminished reputations, male violence in intimate relationships,
pregnancy, and disease. 95
Girls internalize messages of fear,
responsibility, and shame so effectively that they seldom report
experiencing pleasure in their sexual encounters.
As Tolman
concludes: "By dousing desire with fear and confusion or simple,
'uncomplicated' denial, silence and dissociation, these girls . ..make

individual psychological moves whereby296they distance or disconnect
themselves from discomfort and danger. ,
An important tension is inherent in these findings. That tension
grows out of an inability to know whether girls simply do not
experience sexual desire and pleasure, or rather, that they cannot
articulate those experiences. If the former is true, troublesome
implications arise regarding the established definition of consensual,
non-procreative sex, which is premised on a notion of mutual pleasure.
While this uncertainty is unlikely to be resolved, a thriving discourse is
emerging about the various other reasons which lead girls to consent to
sex. Moreover, even assuming that girls do experience sexual pleasure
and desire, these are only two of a multiplicity of factors which induce
their consent to sex.
The stories girls tell about the "consensual" sex in which they
engage reflect a poignant subtext of hope and pain.2 97 Girls express
longing for emotional attachment, romance, and respect."' At the same
time, they suffer enormous insecurity and diminished self-image. 299
These two factors are clearly interrelated--the worse girls feel about
themselves, the more they look to males for ratification of the women
that they are becoming.3°° The importance of being attractive to males
takes on a central role in many girls' lives. This may be evidenced by
294 Tolman,

supra note 21, at 5-6 (noting that the girls in the study were

heterosexual and lesbian, white and of color, middle-class and working class).
29
'Id.at 25.
6d.
I' at 27.
2971thank Jane Larson for her insight in helping me to clarify these ideas.
29' See DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 226, at 69-75.
299
id.

'00
Id. at 201 ("Girls' feelings of powerlessness trigger their psyches to protect
them. With their newfound intellectual capacities, they begin to see themselves as
they imagine others see them and internalize what they perceive to be male standards
of beauty. Many girls react by looking at and judging themselves in the same way that
boys look at and judge them.").
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seemingly innocuous behaviors such as increased bathroom time in the
morning before school, and wearing make-up and padded bras, but it is
also seen in the epidemic of dieting among girls, and the devastating
toll taken by the eating disorders that result from distorted body
image.0' Teenage girls recognize that they are, or at least that they
should be, obiects of desire. The romantic aspirations which girls
report reflect these insecurities. Girls want boyfriends, relationships, or
somebody who will hold them and tell them that they are wanted.
Girls negotiate access to the fulfillment of these emotional
needs by way of sex.302 A girl who wants males to find her attractive,
who wants acceptance and popularity, might reasonably consent to sex
with a popular boy, with multiple popular boys, or with any partner
who can persuade her that she is attractive and desirable.03 Males
recognize, and occasionally exploit, girls' insecurity. Thus, it is no
coincidence that the ubiquitous "pick up" line almost always plays to a
female's desire for acceptance.' °4

30' One

study of pre-teenage girls has revealed that 80% of the 10- and 11-year-

old girls surveyed said they diet to lose weight. Jeannine Stein, Why Girls as Young
as Nine Fear Fat and Go on Diets to Lost Weight, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1986. In
another study, it was reported that two-thirds of girls aged 13 to 18 were trying to lose
weight. J.C. Rosen and J. Cross, Prevalence of Weight Reducing and Weight Gaining
in Adolescent Girls and Boys, 26 HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY, 131-47 (1987).
Approximately 3% to 8% of women between 13 and 30 have an eating disorder.
Carole Sugarman, A Wide Variety of Eating Disorders, WASH. POST, May 3, 1994, at
Z16.
.02
See, e.g., Tolman, supra note 21, at 11 (discussing Rochelle, who avoided boys
early on, in order to avoid getting a bad reputation, but began to feel she "had to get a
boyfriend" during her sophomore year in high school. "I felt as though I had to
conform to everything he said .... When the sex came ... I did it without thinking..
. I wish I would have waited .... I just did it because, maybe because he wanted it,
and I was always like tryin' to please him ....

he was real mean, mean to me, now

that I think about it. I was like kind of stupid, cause like I did everything for him and
he just treated me like I was nothing and I just thought I had to stay with him because
I needed a boyfriend so bad to make my life complete.").
303Evidence of this is seen in the fact that anorexic and bulimic girls, whose
illness often prevents them from sustaining a relationship with a single partner, are
notoriously sexually promiscuous. One of the symptoms used to diagnose an eating
disorder is evidence of promiscuity, as it indicates the patients' obsessive need for
others to confirm their attractiveness.
'04 A recent study asked college-aged males about the various ways they
persuaded females to engage in intercourse with them. Flattery ranked high among
strategies which ranged from plying with alcohol to telling a girl that he loved her
("women fall for it all the time"); to telling a girl that they can be trusted ("You can
trust me. I wouldn't hurt you.") and that the girl is unique and special ("I've never met
anyone like you before.") Collison, supra note 219.
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That desire explains the success of the Spur Posse boys in their
3 0 5 The Spur Posse boys were
game of "hooking" female partners.
the
most popular students at Lakewood High School. Even though they
described "hooking" as mere banter and may have assumed that the
girls knew that they were just joking-- that they just wanted to have
intercourse with them in order to earn a point-- the girls wanted the
attention of these popular boys. At some level, the girls' self-esteem
was contingent on these boys finding them desirable. At another level,
each of the girls believed the boys were sincere.3 °6
The intercourse which results from these various persuasive
techniques is generally not considered rape. In some cases, it might
resemble what Robin West has called "giving self," wherein a woman
diffuses the danger she perceives in a potentially violent heterosexual
encounter by "giving him what he wants."3 7 In other cases, a male may
commit "sexual fraud," by inducing consent by misrepresenting his
intentions. 8
Even if they defy legal categorization, construing these sexual
encounters as anything but scary, painful, shaming, and/or
unpleasurable for the minor girls involved requires people to strain
their imaginations, and invoke false stereotypes such as the "passive
female" who secretly longs for her male partner to overwhelm her.3°9
Ultimately, a girl who succumbs to any of these inducements is harmed
by the sexual encounter.
She is exploited and shamed, has a
diminished sense of self and a damaged reputation. 3'
And yet,
decriminalizing statutory rape eclipses these harms and legitimizes
these tactics.
Girls exchange sex for intangible offerings of acceptance and
ratification. These bargains seem foolish to adults, who recognize the
sentiments expressed in pick-up lines or "hooking" games as ephemeral
at best, and at worst, utterly insincere. Yet, girls routinely accept these
305See

supra notes 1 to 34 and accompanying text.
'0 A recent national poll provides dramatic evidence of this point: 71% of the
girls surveyed reported being in love with their latest sexual partner, while only 45%
of the boys said the same. Half of Sexually Active Teens Tell Survey: Wish I'd
Waited, Cm. TRIB., May 18, 1994, at N4.
307Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 103 (1987). Note that
this language mirrors that used by the victim in Michael M. v. Sonoma County
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
3 See Jane E. Larson, Women Understand So Little ...93 COLUM.L.REv. 374
(1993).
'o9
Henderson, supra note 28, at 65.
30 See supra notes 282 to 296 and accompanying text.
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terms, hoping that sex will bring them the romantic attention which
they crave. 3 '
The sexual bargains struck by girls are not irrational. They
watch the women around them, and observe the message that society
promotes and that most women's behavior exemplifies: romantic
partnerships with men mark the only official route to self-fulfillment
and happiness for women." 2
Nevertheless, these bargains are
undeniably bad ones for many girls. In exchange for risking injury to
their bodily integrity, their dignity, and their frail sense of self-worth,
girls seldom get the emotional support they seek. In fact, the bargain
often diminishes them.
A girl's perceived sexual availability is intricately tied to her
social status. A girl who is viewed by her peers as a slut will be exiled
to the fringes of her peer group." 3 While there is no precise definition
of a slut (a gendered term for which there is no male equivalent),3 .4 the
term generally refers to a girl who is sexually accessible to many males,
and whose popularity is linked to her sexual accessibility. A girl who
is labelled a slut has a "bad reputation," does not merit others' respect,
and has an internalized sense of worthlessness which places her at a
higher risk not only for pregnancy, but also for a variety of selfdestructive behaviors, including becoming a high school drop-out,
becoming involved in drugs and crime, and ultimately, being
unemployed and dependent on state support as an adult. 1' 5 Obviously,
not all promiscuous teenage girls suffer these consequences, but one of
the most terrible and confusing aspects of female teenage sexuality is
the absence of guidelines that inform girls which behavior will lead
to
3 16
their being ostracized, and which behavior their peers will tolerate.
3"Tolman, supra note 21.
312Some call this phenomenon the "tyranny of coupledom." For more on the
subject, see generally, JUDITH LEVINE, MY ENEMY, MY LOVE: MAN-HATING AND
AMBIVALENCE IN WOMEN'S LIVES (1992); STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER
WERE (1992); Judith Stacey, The New Family Values Crusaders, THE NATION, July

25, 1994, at 119.
3,3 A friend recounted a story of a woman who was a member of her sorority at a
large midwestem university. According to rumors, the woman became intoxicated at
a fraternity party and had sex that night with as many as 15 of the brothers. The
sorority responded to the rumor by shunning the woman and kicking her out of the
house. Interview with MaryBeth S., in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 1994).
314Sengupta, supra note
11.
3.See generally Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States
Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324
(1991); Luker, supra note 258.
316 Even for girls who steer clear of the stigma of being labelled a slut,
sexual
activity may carry some amorphous long-term risks. Consider the interrelation of the
AAUW study on girls' diminished academic achievement and girls' desires for
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C. Consent as a Non-Sequitur
The implications of these findings are profoundly disturbing in light of
the present legal presumption of non-intervention in cases in which
girls have "consented" to intercourse. In attempting to reconcile the
research about adolescent girls with the modem incarnation of statutory
rape laws, it seems that the law plays into adolescent girls'
vulnerabilities. Evidence that girls consent to sex for foolish and
mistaken reasons (e.g., that sex will earn them male approval and
acceptance) should lead to the conclusion that girls lack the capacity for
meaningful consent. The new social "norm" of non-abstinence may
accurately reflect society's perception that girls are legitimate targets of
male sexual desire, 17 but this does not demonstrate that girls are now
sexually "liberated."
Even if girls can experience, but cannot
acknowledge, sexual pleasure and desire, the factors they do
acknowledge as inducing their consent to sex should lead to a
reconsideration of the definition of "consensual" as it applies to teenage
girls.
The need for this reevaluation is vividly demonstrated by
examining the divergent accounts of the sexual encounter described in
the Michael M. case.3 18
Justice Blackmun viewed the couples'
interaction as plainly consensual. As evidence, he pointed to "their
drinking; their withdrawal from the others of the group; their foreplay,
romance. See WELLESLEY AAUW REPORT, supra note 227. Girls widely report
feeling that being too smart will interfere with their ability to attract a boyfriend. See
id. Once involved in a "serious" relationship, girls respond by lowering their
professional goals and expectations, and focusing their energy on romance. By tracing
the effect of romance on girls' and women's educational career choices, a recent study
of college students demonstrates that even girls who enter college intending to pursue
a professional career tend to abandon those plans in order to secure a relationship with
a man. DOROTHY HOLLAND & MARGARET EISENHART, EDUCATED IN ROMANCE

(1990).

117See

supra note 18 and accompanying text (regarding media's erotic portrayal of
girls). See also Perry, supra note 18 (reporting that "sexist attitudes remain a major
risk factor for girls," according to Dr. James Garbarino, president of the Erikson
Institute for Advanced Study in Child Development. Garbarino added that many boys
feel that if a girl is dressed seductively, she has lost the right to say no. Perry adds,
"Sex spices everything from rock videos and talk shows to PG-13 movies and fastfood commercials. .

.

. Having been told repeatedly that they're sex objects, girls

become even more subject to the usual teen anxieties about appearance [and many
girls become anorexic or bulemic or undergo liposuction or other surgery]." Kristen
Gold, of the Ms. Foundation for Women, says .... "'It's not, if you study you can do
this. It's if you mutilate yourself, you too can look like this. We make their focus
pleasing other people and physical beauty.' Pleasing others often translates into
having sex.")
"' Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol.8.1:109

in which she willingly participated and seems to have encouraged, and
the closeness of their ages."3 9 Then, Blackmun cited what he believed
was her admission of "consent": "I was trying to get up and he hit me
back down on the bench and then I just said to myself, 'Forget it,' and I
let him do what he wanted to do." 0
Many commentators take issue with Blackmun's interpretation
of the couple's interaction. Lynne Henderson argues that Blackmun's
analysis:
reinterprets [the story] in a way to make what looks like force and
nonconsent into a case of male innocence and female responsibility
....This is not a forcible rape, despite the fact that the defendant
hit the victim in the chin--force--and ignored her no--nonconsent..
. [Blackmunl transforms what we called "making out" when I was
a teenager into 'foreplay,' and, as we all know, 'foreplay' is the term
for what you do before you have heterosexual intercourse.32 '

In confining its inquiry to an assessment of whether "consent"
was given, modem statutory rape law loses sight of the considerable
coercion, violence, and ambivalence in "consensual" teen sex. Even
between age-mates in a situation of apparent social equality, power
may be so vastly imbalanced that evidence of verbal consent does not
reveal the true nature of a teenage sexual encounter.
Modern statutory rape law imposes a binary analysis on the
sexual encounter. It classifies intercourse as either consensual sex or
rape. However, from the girl's vantage point, her consent may have
been so fraught with ambivalence that it was meaningless. This search
for evidence of nonconsent (or force) causes the finder of fact to turn
away from the story told by the girl in order to evaluate the story from
a "neutral" vantage point.
As a result, the legal system never comes to terms with the
ambiguity inherent in the sexual choices made by teenage girls. While
commentators fault traditional statutory rape law for only defending
girls' chastity, they can just as easily fault the current, binary
classification for failing to insure that girls freely choose to consent. If
girls' autonomy is to be taken seriously, 22 the law must evaluate the
sexual decisions they make, and formulate a legal response which
enhances the likelihood that those decisions are autonomous ones.

319

Id. at 484-85.

30 id. at 485.
32,
Henderson,
322See

supra note 28, at 147; Olsen, supra note 45.
Schulhofer, supra note 30.
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IV. RETHINKING STATUTORY RAPE LAW
"What the law owes us is a celebration of our autonomy ... ,,323
The question arising from the preceding section is whether the
criminal law protects minors from the harms they might suffer upon
engaging in "adult" sexual activity. In choosing not to enforce the law
in cases of "consensual" sex among minors, the criminal justice system
posits that minors engaging in adult activities must do so on adult
terms. This contrasts dramatically with both contract and tort law, in
which a general presumption that minors lack full legal capacity,
coupled with awareness that minors inevitably will engage in adult
activities, leads to provisions designed to limit the harm minors might
suffer due to their lack of discretion.
Clearly, permitting minors to void their contracts reflects
societal views on the nature of commercial transactions, and permitting
minors to consent to certain medical treatment reflects societal views
on the desirability of that treatment. Similarly, the present construction
of statutory rape laws reflects an underlying assumption about the
nature of sexual relations. In classifying sexual relations as either
consensual or forcible, and then defining as permissible all sexual
interactions which are free from evidence of force, the law endorses
sexual relations as presumptively positive for girls as well as for
women. And yet, evidence shows that girls' sexual encounters, like
medical treatments and commercial transactions, are not uniformly
positive. On some occasions, a girl may consent to sex which is
exploitative, degrading, demeaning, and harmful to her. But the law
does not recognize it as rape.
The harm which results from a minor's bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business
deal. Yet, the law, as presently construed, does not protect minors from
the harmful consequences of their attempts at adult sexual behavior.
The failure to craft a legal safety-net for girls may stem from
the general difficulty of differentiating permissible sexual encounters
from impermissible ones. This is evinced by Antioch College's
proposed stage-based system for ascertaining consent in sexual
interactions. That system requires initiators of sexual activities to ask
for their partner's verbal consent for each act of intimacy, and it was
born of an acknowledgement that there is little consensus on what

323ESTRICH,

supra note 29, at 102.
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constitutes consensual sex and what becomes rape.324 Ironically, the
flurry of critical media response to the proposal, generally arguing that
it threatens to take all the fun out of sex, provides ample evidence of
the entrenchment of the hazy spectrum that separates consensual sex
from rape."'
One response to the harms girls suffer is to view the sexual
encounters as rites of passage. For example, Camille Paglia and Katie
Roiphe might argue that women should accept the above incidents of
sexual coercion, and let men be men.326 This response reflects the
perverse phenomena of adult women who have become convinced that
they can preserve their own sexual liberation only by diminishing the
importance or denying the reality of the harms others suffer within that
system. However, the girls who consent to exploitive sex suffer real
harm, and recognizing their experiences as harmful is only the first step
toward crafting a legal remedy which would acknowledge those harms
and insofar as possible, prevent their recurrence.
It is possible to view the injuries some girls suffer as civil
wrongs, for which they are entitled to compensation. For example, if a
boy lies to a girl to procure her consent, he has committed sexual
fraud.327 As such, the girl should have a cause of action, sounding in
tort, under which she can sue him. Yet, this may provide a hollow
victory if the boy is insolvent. Moreover, the risk of being sued for
sexual fraud is marginal, and most likely would not be a significant
deterrent. Additionally, the relatively unformed nature of sexual fraud
as a cause of action means that, in practice, a plaintiffs ability to
recover may turn on her ability to invoke a jury's sympathy. Therefore,
the tort may help only those girls who are able to cast themselves as
"innocent," and may do little to help a girl who was flirtatious, drunken,
324

See Jason Vest, The School That's Put Sex to the Test at Antioch, a Passionate

Reaction to Consent Code, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1993, at G1; Jennifer Wolff, Sex by
the Rules, GLAMOUR MAGAZINE, May 1994, at 256-59, 290.
...
Margarette Driscoll, Have We Gone Too Far?, THE TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993;
Mary Matalin, Stop Whining!, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 62 ("This policy is
premised on the overhyped problem of campus date rape .... Well, get these moody
[campus feminists] a prescription of Motrin and water pills, quick."). For a critique of
the "pro-sex" feminist movement, see Katha Pollit, Gender Wars, THE NATION,
March 21, 1994, at 369. (In discussing pro-sex feminists such as Katie Roiphe,
Camille Paglia, and others, Pollit asks, "But really, is it feminism's iob to save the
penis? Can't men do anything for themselves? ... Who, exactly, are all those women-call them 'who me?' feminists--who've given up sex (and men!)?").
326 See generally CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE: ART AND DECADENCE
FROM NEFERTITI To EMILY DICKINSON (1991); KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER:

SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993).
327Larson,

supra at 308.
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or promiscuous. More importantly, a girl can invoke a cause of action
for sexual fraud only if the boy lied to her. Yet, because of girls'
psychosocial vulnerability, the process of successfully negotiating
sexual access to girls is often too subtle to be considered "fraud."
The criminal law has been the standard solution to the problem
of girls' sexual exploitation, and it avoids many of the shortcomings
inherent in the civil law approach. Nevertheless, it raises many more
problems of its own. The binary division between consensual sex and
rape is a false dichotomy,"' and, as noted, the application of that
dichotomy to minors eclipses devastatingly harmful interactions. Adult
men and women know that sex is far more nuanced than the dichotomy
implies, yet they hesitate to reconceive the paradigm, or even to
articulate what is ambiguous about it. They are afraid that by
acknowledging the gray area between fully consensual sex and rape,
the zone in which girls experience many of their sexual encounters,
they will jeopardize their own access to sexual pleasure. Rather than
hold girls hostage in the gray zone, society must acknowledge girls'
vulnerability by criminalizing predatory sexual behavior against them.
This requires legislatures to remedy the inadequacies of statutory rape
laws.
The common law formulation of statutory rape, with its
restrictive focus on guarding girls' virginity, did virtually nothing to
ensure girls' sexual autonomy.3 2 9 Rather, the law functioned as a tool
by which a girl's parents could impose a distance between their
daughter and her suitors.
The new generation of statutory rape laws, with complex agespan provisions designed to identify potentially coercive interactions,
does little to remedy the problems inherent in the common law. The
age-based standards by which the laws identify presumptive coercion
represent little more than adult perceptions of power and vulnerability
in adolescent relations. Moreover, the attempt to identify differing
degrees of sexual coercion by age or family relation seems to endorse
the notion that fully consensual intercourse between teenagers is the
norm, and is not legally problematic. Thus, law enforcement officials,
most of whom are male, become self-appointed judges of whether a girl
voluntarily consented to intercourse. Further, the promiscuity defense is
alive and well in many jurisdictions.
328Henderson,

supra note 28. Henderson posits a spectrum of sexual interactions

ranging from rape to pleasurable, mutually-fulfilling sex.
329Olsen, supra note 45, at 404 (noting that traditional statutory rape laws were

another mechanism of "social control of women, not of men," reinforcing "the sexual
stereotypes of men as aggressors and women as passive victims," thus perpetuating
the "double standard of sexual morality.").
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The legal status quo, coupled with the emerging norm of
premarital non-abstinence and the eroticization of girls, renders girls
more vulnerable to sexual exploitation than they have been at any other
point in history. Girls need the law to secure their sexual autonomy.
And statutory rape laws, both as traditionally conceived and as
presently construed, miserably fail this task.
The problems inherent in any attempt to reform statutory rape
laws to reinforce and enhance girls' autonomy are complicated and
elusive. Thus, rather than proposing a solution, this final section
attempts to identify and classify those problems, and places them into
three categories: the "philosophical" problems, the legal standard
setting problems, and the enforcement problems.
A. Philosophical/Definitional Problems
Any attempt to reshape statutory rape laws to properly consider girls'
autonomy will court "essentialist" disaster.330 Moreover, because most
girls are sexually active, and the circumstances under which they
engage in sex vary, statutory rape laws have the potential to treat those
girls as if they were suffering from "false consciousness." Laws which
fail to both define coercive and non-coercive sex, and differentiate
between them, ignore the fact that girls can identify and experience
both pleasure and love in their intimate relationships.
This problem may be an example of the unfortunate, but
inevitable, risk of any legal effort to regulate minors' sexuality. As
such, one possible solution is a bright-line rule based on age. For
example, legislatures could enact modern versions of the common law
rule in which no girl under a statutorily determined age could give a
valid consent to sex--whether she was promiscuous or not. The risks of
error--that a court could convict a man of statutory rape even though
the victim freely consented to intercourse--might be preferable to the
risk that courts would use the mere evidence of a girl's consent to
legitimate virtually all sexually predatory behavior.
A more nuanced approach would work to directly identify
forms of sexual coercion. The normative stance of the present law is
blunt and inaccurate: age-based presumptions, coupled with the false
notion that "experienced" girls can take care of themselves, make a
poor proxy for coercion. Lawmakers need to examine the legitimacy of
330

Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS.L.REV. 539 (1989); Angela

Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 19, at 118-35 (defining essentialism as "the notion that a unitary, 'essential'
women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual

orientation, and other realities of experience.").
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the factors that lead a girl to say "yes" to sex.33 ' This process could be
facilitated by referencing the rich body of scholarship analyzing power
differentials in sexual contexts ranging from forcible rape to
seduction.332

Currently, the law prohibits intercourse with minors by virtue of
age-range, and proximity of family relation. A revised statute could
identify additional sexual scenarios as presumptively suspect or even
illegal by definition. For example, legislators could enact a rule barring
sexual encounters between several males and one minor female.
Likewise, the law could require greater scrutiny of evidence that a
minor girl consented to sex. For example, courts could require a
critical examination of the method by which consent was procured,
disallowing forms of behavior deemed coercive.
B. Problems in Setting a Legal Standard
When a legislature crafts a law to both effectuate girls' autonomy and
protect them from sexual coercion, it must consider notice issues,
privacy issues, and equal protection issues. First, the attempt to revise
statutory rape laws to identify coercion raises troublesome due process
concerns because of the ambiguity inherent in many sexual encounters.
Unless the law carefully delineates impermissible sexual acts, those
who have intercourse with minor girls may not know that they are
3"' In this regard, the work of anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday is instructive.
Sanday's study of "fraternity" sexual activity reveals a complex set of male behaviors
surrounding efforts to obtain a female's consent to intercourse. PEGGY REEVES
SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX, BROTHERHOOD, & PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS
(1990). One particularly disturbing passage reports the following conversation among
fraternity brothers discussing "party sex":
"Sometimes a woman has to resist your advances to show how sincere she is.
And so, sometimes you've gotta help them along. You know she means no the first
time, but the third time she could say no all night and you know she doesn't mean it."
"Yeah, no always means no at the moment, but there might be other ways of..."
"Working a yes out?"
"Yeah!"
"Get her out on the dance floor, give her some drinks, talk to her for awhile."
"Agree to something, sign the papers..
"And give her some more drinks!"
"Ply her with alcohol."
Id. These behaviors lie somewhere along the spectrum leading to rape, and,
because of lower self-esteem, less alcohol tolerance, insecurity, vulnerability to peer
pressure, etc., minor girls may be even more likely than college students to be
seduced by them.
332See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 30; Henderson, supra note 28; West, supra
note 307; Larson, supra note 308. Schulhofer, Henderson, West, and Larson have
each worked to identify markers along spectrum differentiating rape from intercourse
which was freely and fully consented to.
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violating it.333 Second, efforts to criminalize certain instances of sexual

interactions with minor girls may .jeopardize minors' rights to privacy,
which currently permit them to obtain reproductive health care. And
while minors' rights to privacy, which permit them access to
contraception and abortion, arise not out of deference to minors'
maturity, but rather, out of policy determinations favoring access to
these medical needs, 3 laws which treat minors as insufficiently mature
to consent to sex might easily become ammunition for those wishing to
restrict minors' access to reproductive health care.
Moreover, carefully drafted and seriously enforced statutory
rape laws might conflict with minors' confidentiality rights in the health
care setting. Already a delicate balancing act is required to encourage
sexually active minors to take precautions to avoid unwanted
pregnancy and disease, without necessarily encouraging them to
become sexually active. The threat of criminal sanctions might disrupt
this balance by discouraging minors from seeking reproductive health
care and counseling. They may fear that their health care providers will
report them to the police, and in fact, they may be right. Health care
providers have broad access to information regarding minors' sexual
activity. Thus, the law must clarify the extent to which that information
will be kept confidential, and when, if ever, a health care provider
should report possible violations of statutory rape laws to state
officials.335
Finally, there is the question of gender-specific laws. While the
Supreme Court, in Michael M.,33 6 upheld a gender-specific statutory
rape law against an equal protection challenge, most states' laws are
gender-neutral. This makes it difficult to determine victim and
perpetrator, especially in cases involving two teenagers, because they
will not necessarily follow from gender. Instead, the law requires that a
judge pay close attention to the context of the sexual encounter in order
to discern the potential for vulnerability and coercion. A judge who has
...
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (explaining that the
Constitution "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."). See also,
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
114 See supra notes 177 to 217 and accompanying
text.
...
Presently, Planned Parenthood and other clinics serving teens generally do not
notify the criminal iustice system of statutory rape law violations. For example, when
a 12-year-old girl comes to a clinic seeking contraception, and reports that her current
partner is 20 years old, the providers treat this information as confidential. See supra
note 200 and accompanying text.
336450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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difficulty empathizing with the perspective of a fourteen-year-old girl,
for example, may find it hard to distinguish the victim from the
perpetrator, and may therefore prefer to view both parties as
accomplices, or simply refuse to apply the law.337

The principal

arguments against gender-specific laws are that they are archaic, and
that they unfairly stigmatize girls.338 A variation of this argument
perceives boys as having been socialized to pursue sex in a predatory
and competitive manner. Accordingly, the law should be sensitive to
this socialization. Even if coercive male initiative is wrong, it is ironic,
if not unfair, to punish boys with criminal convictions for doing what
society, the media, their parents--in short, all the forces in their
universe--have taught them to do. This insight does not vitiate the
criminal nature of the act of coercing sex from girls, but it compels a
broader view of the changes needed to promote the autonomy and
safety of both boys and girls.
C. Enforcement and Enforceability Problems
Inherent in each of the above issues are questions about the
enforcement of statutory rape laws. Given the contrast between the law
in theory and the law in practice, it is irresponsible to posit legal change
without identifying the likely beneficiaries and victims of that change.
This inquiry raises the questions of who will invoke statutory rape
laws, and to whom the laws will apply.
Professor Fran Olsen concluded that, under the common law
formulation of statutory rape, girls were powerless to stop their parents
from pursuing statutory rape prosecutions. 9 As a remedy, she
suggested that girls retain a power of "voidable consent," whereby only
girls can choose to bring charges for statutory rape, and they can do so

117 A slight variation of this problem has been documented by
Ann Cuda, counsel
for Chicago NOW, who completed a 1992 study of sexual violence crimes in the
Cook County criminal justice system. Her study contrasts grand jury indictments in
sexual assault reports (64%) with findings of probable cause in preliminary hearings
(28%), documenting a disturbing pattern of "no cause" dismissals in preliminary
hearing cases. She notes that the high rates of dismissal in preliminary hearings may
reflect the fact that the states' attorneys are disinclined to prosecute cases which are
difficult to win. Therefore, the theory goes, the states attorneys elect to take the more
challenging cases to preliminary hearing, rather than to the grand jury, knowing the
judge will likely dismiss the charges. Most troublesome is the fact that these "difficult
cases" dismissed by the judge are disproportionately those in which the victims are
young, minority women and girls. Interview with Ann Cuda, in Chicago, IL. (January
1994).
...
See Olsen, supra note 45.
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Id. at 404.
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even if they consented to intercourse.
While this approach mirrors
the common law tradition of contract and has the advantage of
empowering girls (or at least of putting their would-be "suitors" on
notice), it is problematic. As noted, the criminal law requires that
persons be put on notice about what activities are criminal.3 4' A law
that permits a girl to determine, after the fact, whether an instance of
sexual intercourse was criminal, fails to define the scope of the criminal
act, except insofar as it puts on notice anyone who would engage in sex
with a minor that the act may later be deemed a crime.
More importantly, even if the law was constitutional, those
same factors which impair girls' autonomy in sexual decision-making
impede their ability seek legal redress for the wrongs they have
suffered. The typical minor victim's response to rape is shame and selfdoubt, and a reluctance to speak to anyone about it. If the typical
victim of statutory rape is a girl who consented to intercourse with a
male who later made her feel inadequate by either hurting or rejecting
her, it seems unlikely that she would have the self-confidence to tell the
police. If the point of revising statutory rape laws is to take into
account girls' vulnerability, placing the laws' enforcement on the girls'
shoulders makes little sense.342

Conversely, statutory rape laws could be drafted to permit the
victims the right to prevent criminal charges from being filed. This
would permit parents and other authority figures to seek criminal
sanctions, but would give the victim the power to prevent retaliatory
prosecutions. However, depending on her relationship with her
parents, she may feel unable to challenge their determination to press
charges. It also allows the defendant the opportunity to pressure the
girl into dropping the charges.3 43 Nevertheless, it recognizes the girl's
340 1d. at 408.
See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
342 At the same time, it is important to consider the possibility of revenge-based
prosecutions. A law permitting the victim to press charges at her discretion must
determine a method for discerning the veracity of the claimed injury. Still, there is
little reason to believe that girls will be more likely to fabricate statutory rape crimes
if they alone are given this discretion than they are under the present system. The act
of coming forward and acknowledging that one is a victim of statutory rape would
hardly provide an easy way for a girl to "save face" with her angry parents. More
likely, it would entail a time-consuming public disclosure of a humiliating event, and
would subject her to the critical scrutiny of her friends and family.
-' Additionally, it is somewhat reminiscent of the situation in domestic violence
cases, wherein the victim often refuses to cooperate in the prosecution of her batterer.
This occurs in large part because the victim perceives herself as emotionally, as well
as financially, dependent upon the batterer. It has led several jurisdictions to adopt
"mandatory arrest" laws which require arrests whenever police find evidence of
14'
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moral agency, and empowers her, rather than treat her as the object of a
crime.
The second enforcement issue regarding the scope of these laws
relates not only to the question of who retains power to press charges,
but also to the issue of judicial sensitivity. If statutory rape laws
require judges to evaluate cases for evidence of coercion, rather than
apply bright-line rules, then judges must be acutely aware of the
pressures that coerce girls into consenting to sex. These pressures are
obvious in some cases, but not all. For instance, Michael M. was
reviewed by several courts, and none of the judges recognized that the
defendant used force to procure sex." This is cause for concern. To
the extent that the law is open-ended, judges evaluate cases by relying
on their own sense of a victim's morality and blameworthiness. 1 5 This
may be an argument in favor of laws which specifically name
presumptively coercive sexual encounters.
V. CONCLUSION
No legal solution will eliminate the risks inherent in sexual activity and
permit girls to "come of age" safely. Psychologists, sociologists, sex
educators, and children's advocates are in better positions than lawyers
to understand and recommend solutions to the problems of girls'
vulnerability and the imbalance of power in sexual encounters. Yet, for
the foreseeable future, the legal system will have to provide remedies in
cases involving coercive sexual encounters with girls. As a result, the
law must carefully analyze these sexual interchanges. The law of
criminal sexual assault must have as its goal the promotion of sexual
autonomy. 346 To preserve girls' sexual autonomy, the law cannot
privilege consent obtained through coercion and a girl's naivete. Thus,
the deceptively facile determination that a girl verbally consented to a
sexual encounter is only a starting point for inquiring into whether the
encounter was, in fact, consensual. By expanding its inquiry into these
issues, the criminal justice system will begin to fulfill its unique and
essential role in creating a safer world for girls to grow up in.

violence in responding to a domestic call for help. See

FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE,

supra note 19.
34Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 601 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1979),
affd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
5

See LAFREE, supra note 39.

346Schulhofer,

supra note 30.
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